27-29 March 1996
The Hague, The Netherlands
Netherlands-Indonesian relations between 1945-1950
By Olaf Oudheusden
A variety of scholars from Indonesia, England, Australia, the Netherlands, and the USA contributed giving papers on subjects concerning the decolonization of Indonesia between 1945-1950. The seminar, which was divided into four sessions, highlighted all the parties that were involved in the struggle for Independence of Indonesia. The guiding theme for this seminar was introduced by Professor H.W. von der Dunk in his keynote speech "Intention and effect". Von der Dunk concluded that the intentions behind the official policy in the Netherlands between 1945 and 1950 can be judged only by historians. Their ability to take an impartial distance from the facts of the period of decolonization is necessary to estimate intentions and effects. On the last day the participants discussed the writing of historiography and the perspective of the public opinion. This produced a vivid debate between scholars, journalists, and those who were interested in this period of Dutch colonial history. At the end of the conference the twentieth volume of the Officiële beschei- den was presented to the Dutch Minister of Education, Culture and Science, Prof. J.J.M. Ritzen and the ambassador of the Repu- blic Indonesia in the Netherlands, Mr. J.B.S. Kadarisman. In view of the extent of this conference this report will focus only on a few highlights.
Prof. William H. Frederick used an example of local history as a
key to understanding the British intermezzo in Java during the
revolution in 1945. He stated that the Battle of Surabaya
(November 10, 1945) was not only started to divide extremists and
moderates, but that British feelings of revenge compounded by
ignorance played a major role in this confrontation. The British
troops around Surabaya believed that launching mass actions
against the Republic would divide the extremists from the
moderates. A miscalculation as the use of violence had the
opposite effect and made the Republican efforts even more
fervent. Frederick concluded that to achieve a better understan-
ding of the processes in diplomatic and local history needs a
kind of working dialogue between the two fields. Frederick
believes that this is the best foundation for a genuinely useful
'international' history.
Prof. G.D. Homan's contribution dealt with the American
involvement in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. It was not until
the summer of 1948 that the USA relinquished its pro-Dutch
position in the dispute. The reversal of stance, from the Dutch
to the Indonesian camp, was not based simply on the fear of the
rise of communism in Indonesia. The major factor that led to the
reversal of USA standpoints was disappointment with the Dutch
decolonization policy. By mid-1948 Washington concluded that the
Dutch plans for Indonesian self-government lacked sincerity. The
man who played a key role in changing the USA policy was Dean
Rusk, director of the Office of Special Political Affairs. He
wanted the UN to play a more important role in world affairs and
outmanoeuvred the Europeanists, such as Acheson, in the State
Department. Homan's conclusion ended with the remark that the
Netherlands should change its view about the American policy,
because it had saved the Dutch from fighting a protracted and
exhausting war against the Indonesians.
The intentions behind and the effects of Dutch politics during
1945-'50 were highlighted with detailed research subjects
presented solely by Dutch scholars. Dr. H. Meijer gave an example
of the rational, post-war Secretary of State of the Finance
Department, Lieftinck. He was very successful in his efforts to
reform Dutch finances after World War II. Meijer makes it clear
that Lieftinck was solely responsible for deciding how far the
Indonesian policy could go. He was one of the first politicians
to insist on a rapid military action against the Republic. The
first military action in the summer of 1947 did indeed result in
an economic and financial resurrection of the Netherlands.
Lieftinck will go down in history as a pragmatic politician who
put the national interest above party politics. The final results
of the Round Table Conference in The Hague 1949 can to a certain
extent be credited to the personal efforts of Lieftinck.
How strongly the personal efforts of some of the officials
concerned effected the policy of decolonization was revealed by
drs. B.G.J. de Graaff in his contribution about the "boundary
riders" inside the Department of Overseas Territories.
Three officials, Bot, Nagtegaal, and Frederici, purposely leaked
secret information from their department to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. This was a deliberate attempt to damage their
own Secretary of State, Van Sassen. The roots of this concerted
action were anchored in their pre-war education in the Indies.
Their ethical convictions made them committed to the Indonesian
Independence and opposed the conservative stance of Van Sassen.
In contrast to the preceding section, research and writing on
Indonesian history is still a field unexploited by Dutch
scholars. The session on the Indonesian Republic was presented
exclusively by foreigners. Professor R. Mrázek, who
recently published a detailed biography on Sjahrir, gave a lively
impression of this first prime minister of the Republic. Sjahrir
represented the Partai Sosialis Indonesia and this made him
popular above all other Indonesian revolutionaries popular in
social democratic circles in the Netherlands. During the
negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic in 1946-
'47, most Dutch politicians supported Sjahrir in favour of
Soekarno. It is surprising that a man, on whom all Dutch
intentions were focused, has fallen into oblivion with Dutch
historians and the general public anno 1996. Mrázek stated
that the left-wing politics, which Sjahrir represented, were
given scant recognition in the Republic of 1945. Although Sjahrir
had formal power, he stood squeezed in between the radical
demands of 100% merdeka (freedom) of his people and the tenacity
of the Dutch. The tragedy of socialism in Indonesia during the
revolution period was the lack of support for it among the
Indonesian people. Both the Netherlands and Soekarno's republic
realized that the limited reach of Sjahrir's politics would have
little effect on future developments. In response they changed
their policies, after the Linggadjati agreement of March
1947.
The importance of the military forces as a foundation for the
newly emerged Republic is a matter of dispute between military
and political historians. The fact is as Jaap de Moor declared in
his paper, that after the Lingadjati agreement the Dutch general
Spoor worked, on plans for cooperation between Indonesia and the
Netherlands. Spoor's intentions behind this cooperation could be
construed as neo-colonial because a combined Indonesian-Dutch
army would have retained a major influence in the republican
politics. But the military strategy and preliminary research
carried out by Spoor came to nought useless after 1949. Because
after the official transfer of sovereignty, the Republican army
(TNI) was transformed into the Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia
Serikat (APRIS), and the Dutch intervention bore Dead Sea fruit.
By that time Spoor had died. He would have been disappointed with
this outcome. He believed his resolution to strengthen the forces
was the only opportunity to retain some influence in the
Republic.
After two stimulating days, the seminar was closed with a sketch.
Four historians played the characters of Dutch politicians during
the negotiations at Linggadjati in November 1946. Prof. Fasseur
shone, proving his histrionic talents as a convincing Scher-
merhorn.
Popularization
The last day of this conference De Leeuw en de Banteng was
devoted to historiography and public opinion. Gathered in the
Nieuwe Kerk in The Hague, scholars, journalists and politicians
discussed decolonization and the importance of historiography
when a national trauma, such as the decolonization of Indonesia
is felt by some groups in Dutch society, has to be handled.
Elsbeth Locher-Scholten posed the question of why so little
attention is paid to the Officiële bescheiden in the
national press and the recent discussion on the colonial trauma.
Locher-Scholten spoke of the necessity of popularizing the
knowledge that can be found in twenty volumes of the Offici‰le
bescheiden. Their contents link up closely connection to the
evocation of the chairman of the Dutch Parliament, Mr. Deetman,
who asked
historians in general to collect the personal experiences of
those who were involved in the decolonization of Indonesia.
Deetman pleaded for new research in the future, following clearly
in the path of the Oral History Project of Prof. H.
Sutherland from the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. From that
perspective the Officiële bescheiden can play an
important role because the official sources need to be made more
accessible to the public.
The three-day conference was a great achievement for the organizing committee and was a worthy honour for the compilers of the Officiële bescheiden, S.L. van der Wal, P.J. Drooglever, and M.J.B. Schouten. In many respects it was a last opportunity for the eye-witnesses, scholars, and journalists to meet each other. Finally, after fifty years the Netherlands have had their official documents concerning the last years of colonial era published. Should the Indonesian government take equivalent action for their history of the period, a valuable record of the decolonization of the Indies could be presented on the centenary of the Republic of Indonesia in 2045.