Soviet Russia's Policy towards Mongolia 1919-1924
The history of the relations between Russia, Mongolia, and China from 1920 to 1924 appears to have been a minutely researched subject in traditional Soviet and Mongolian historiography. However, while acknowledging the considerable contribution of researchers to the study of this issue, one cannot help noticing a somewhat embroidered and formalized assessment of the key events of the period that recurred in papers written over the 1960s to 1980s, which was only to be expected, given the general ideologization of history at the time. It is still not clear how policies towards China evolved in the Soviet Union and Mongolia and what the true reasons were behind the decisions taken by the Soviet leadership at the time. It is also unclear what Mongolia was to Moscow in these troubled years; was it a small coin changing hands in Soviet-Chinese relations or a proper party in the triangle, with its own approach to various problems?
By Sergei Luzianin
The earliest premeditated steps taken by the Soviet government with
regard to Mongolia go back to the time of the Civil War. In July
1919, the government made public its appeal of Soviet Russia to the
government of Autonomous Mongolia and the Mongolian people, which
listed the general principles of Soviet policy in the East. This
policy included the abrogation of treaties, agreements, and
concessions of tsarist Russia in Mongolia counterbalanced by an
offer of fair official relations on an equal footing to the
government of Mongolia. The appeal did not reach Urga until 1920
and there was virtually no response to it.
The actual policy Soviet Russia pursued in Mongolia focused on
revolutionary work within the framework of the underground activity
of the Mongolian-Tibetan branch of the Communist International
(Comintern) set up in Irkutsk in 1920.
The Irkutsk section of the Comintern focused not only on Mongolia;
its 'Oriental Peoples Section', that included the various branches,
was the chief centre of "revolutionary diplomacy" for the
neighbouring countries of the Far East. The section was supposed to
train and organize communist groups and parties in China, Mongolia,
Japan, and Korea. Its task was to stimulate and support all that
could be subsumed under the heading of "export of the revolution"
to the East.
December 1920 the key item on the agenda of the section's meeting
was the problem of setting up a united national front in Mongolia
to fight Chinese imperialism. The peripatetic activities of the
White Russian Baron Von Ungern-Sternberg in Mongolia subsequently
expelled the Chinese from Mongolia in February 1921. This victory
made the Comintern task more urgent and more concrete. " The
capture of Mongolia by Ungern jeopardizes the revolutionary base of
the Comintern and Soviet Russia, Japan is building up the maritime
provinces, Manchuria and Mongolia, into a kind of black buffer
zone(..). The current mission of the Comintern and Soviet Russia is
to demolish this buffer, or at least its Mongolian segment." In
political terms the Comintern's task was simplified as the
restraining Chinese factor had been pushed to the background and
the cause of liberating Mongolia was beginning to assume the nature
of an effort to destroy a 'class enemy', and at the same time to
eliminate the dangerous bridgehead in Mongolia that was a threat to
the Siberian borders.
The Mongolian Revolution
So on June 1921, a Soviet expeditionary corps joined Sukhebator's
Mongolian army and marched on Urga. In July they entered the city
without meeting any resistance; Ungern-Sternberg had already fled
the city. The provisional revolutionary government, established at
the Siberian town of Khiakhta in 1920, was installed.
Immediately upon the completion of the operation, the events were
assessed by one of the Mongolian 'revolution makers', B.Z.
Shumiatsky. He wrote in a letter: " We have made a certain number
of friends among the Mongolian masses who connect the cause of
their unification and even a part of their existence with Soviet
Russia. We have provided ourselves with an ally who will cover the
most vulnerable sections of our 1,000 kilometre long border(...).
And we're already getting a chance to instigate peaceful economic
relations with Mongolia." Not all comments were as favourable. One
of the more prominent Soviet diplomats, A.A. Ioffe, visiting China
in 1922, wrote a letter to the Soviet leaders in Moscow. He argued
that " Mongolia's sovietization was not the result of any
well-considered and organized plan".
The Mongolian revolution of 1921 was in fact a combination of two
opposing phenomena. On one hand, there was the traditional desire
of the Mongols for sovereignty and independence based on the dual
foundation of pan-Mongolist ideas and anti-Chinese feelings. This
was counterbalanced by the influence from outside by Soviet Russia
and the Comintern that saw Mongolia as a major target for their
revolutionary policies within the general global revolutionary
strategy in the East.
The official status of Outer Mongolia was still unclear. The
position of Outer Mongolia in Soviet-Chinese relations fuelled a
great deal of political debate among the Soviet leadership about
continued support for the Mongolian government and the conclusion
of an agreement with it. From the viewpoint of geopolitical and
revolutionary goals, Soviet Russia had an urgent need to
consolidate the results of the 1921 revolution by giving official
recognition of the people's power in Mongolia. However, diplomatic
objectives pursued by the people's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
in China made such an agreement extremely undesirable, as it would
have aggravated the already tangled problem of establishing
official relations with the Beijing government even more.
After many conferences and debates, a Soviet-Mongolian agreement
was at last signed on November 1921. This agreement on 'the
establishing of friendly relations' was the first international act
that signalled the formation of a political alliance between Russia
and Mongolia in which the latter had to be content with a
subordinate role. Mongolia profited from Soviet Russia's official
recognition because it now had some political and military
guarantees preserving its statehood and even a chance to get rid of
the Chinese suzerainty and achieve full independence. The gain on
the Soviet side, apart from ideological considerations as support
for national revolutionary movements in the East, was the formation
of a friendly buffer state at its border, which was of great
importance in case of any confrontation with China or Japan.
Chinese resistance
Victory celebrations in Moscow and Urga were well under way, but the signing of the
Soviet-Mongolian agreement was only a prelude. Real action did not begin until the arrival of
the Soviet plenipotentiary Paike at Beijing on December 1921.
The 'Mongolian' section of Paike's negotiation programme was based on three points:
participation of Mongolian representatives in the talks; Russian mediation; and autonomy for
Outer Mongolia. The programme had been drawn up in Moscow during the Soviet-Mongolian
talks. The Soviet leadership was hoping to agree with China on a form of existence for Mongolia
that would be acceptable to all parties concerned. They had no desire to yield the ground already
gained. At the same time Soviet Russia did not seem to appreciate the gravity of the situation;
China for all its domestic feuds had no intention of accepting in principle the Soviet method of
dealing with the Mongolian issue. Besides, Paike had Moscow's orders to pass over the
Soviet-Mongolian friendship agreement in silence, which was a tactical mistake. The Chinese
press and officials reacted furiously when they learned about the agreement. "Our government
hereby wishes to express its vigorous protest and declares that none of the treaties concluded
between the Government of Workers and Peasants and Mongolia shall be recognized by the
Chinese Government". In spite of the powerful pressure exerted on him Paikes fought to the bitter
end to carry out Moscow's orders, but he failed to bring the mission to a successful
conclusion.
In 1922 a new representative arrived in China: A.A. Ioffe. He wrote: "Mongolia is the most
sensitive spot in our China policy." He argued for the adoption of a different approach to the
Mongolian problem. He stated that 'giving up' Mongolia would benefit the revolutionary
movement in China and, ultimately the global revolution. The Chinese revolution differs from
other kinds in that it was bound up with the struggle of the south against the 'duijong', the
provincial militarists, who were associated with the idea of 'autonomy' in China. Soviet support
for Mongolian autonomy is seen in China "not merely as interference in their internal affairs but
also, which is far worse, as an anti-revolutionary stand directed against Sun Yatsen". Ioffe also
mentioned that the right to self-determination and separation from China for the Mongols was
becoming both "harmful and unnecessary" in view of the grandiose tasks facing the revolutionary
movements.
This kind of 'revolutionary' cynicism and the trading of the future of whole nations and states
for a 'great cause' was nothing extraordinary at the time. Another argument adduced had to do
with the specific political alignment in China. Sun Yatsen and his temporary ally, Wu Peifu, both
of whom were at the time courted by the Comintern, wanted China to be unified and centralized:
in their conception was no room for the autonomy of Outer Mongolia.
At last Moscow changed its approach and gave up the idea of autonomy for Mongolia. In
February 1924 a Soviet representative stated: "the question of Mongolia is in fact trivial. We
consider Mongolia a part of the Chinese republic. China's sovereignty in Mongolia is something
we do not doubt". Still this new diplomatic interpretation of Mongolia's status did not result in
a weakening of the Soviet position in Mongolia itself. The proclamation of the Mongolian
Peoples Republic on November 1924 signified a further political rapprochement with Soviet
Russia; "the constitution adopted by the Great Khural brings Mongolia nearer to making-up a
Soviet type of state."
Concessions
The Soviet leadership had followed a difficult and changing policy in its attitude towards the
Mongolian issue. Its preferences changed from autonomy for Mongolia to the recognition of
China's full legal sovereignty over Mongolia. This was mainly due to the high expectations it
entertained of a revolution in China and, through that, in the rest of the world. Simultaneously
the Soviet leadership accomplished its tactical goals in China by retaining its old allies in the
south and acquiring new ones in the north; the official government in Beijing. As for Mongolia,
Soviet Russia continued to step up its influence each passing year notwithstanding its recognition
of China's sovereignty. In a broader sense the Mongolian 'concession' by Soviet Russia was
evidence of the fact that the revolutionary and class principles still dominated Soviet diplomacy,
though the rift between the revolutionary class and the state diplomatic approaches was beginning
to take shape. The Chinese revolution was the last hope of the Russian Communists for a 'global
conflagration' in which, they sincerely believed, it was worth using a number of smaller nations
as kindling and the waiving of international legal norms without demur.
Sergei Luzianin is currently working on a PhD thesis at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.