Asean-izing Southeast Asia

By Bilson Kurus

An association encompassing all the current ten countries would be in a stronger position to speak for the destiny of the region, which has long been an arena of great power competition. It will provide a stronger avenue for Southeast asians to be heard in international fora. It will be a potential vehicle for the peoples of the region, if not to lead, then, at least to be legitimate co-partners in shaping the future social, economic and political landscapes of Southeast Asia, the Asia-Pacific, and the world itself.

Consensus
But a bigger Asean will mean new challenges, bigger responsibilities and even potentially more internal squabbles. It will also mean some necessary adjustments on both sides. Is Asean capable or, perhaps more important, willing to confront the consequences of a larger entity?
An immediate challenge for a bigger Asean id getting a diverse group of members to agree with each other. With six members, Asean had already found it difficult to achieve consensus without which Asean had frequently resorted to the expedience of 'agreeing to disagree'. It is unlikely that Asean's consensual modus operandi will be replaced by a majority decision- making process anytime soon.
This means Asean's reliance on pragmatism laced with a generous spirit of compromise and goodwill, on the part of its leaders, will be both correspondingly greater and critical to its organizational cohesion and unity. Minus this ingredient, Asean may find itself backpedalling rather than forging ahead towards the frontier of regionalism in Southeast Asia.
The entrance of members who are further behind in the economic realm in relation to the first six members will unquestionably test the Asean spirit of compromise and goodwill to their limits. Will new members be seen as threats and competitors for extra-Asean investments? Conversely, will investments from the more advanced members be perceived as exploitations by the new members?
If issues such as these are shelved rather than dealt with in a pragmatic and meaningful manner, Asean might unwittingly become a de facto 'disparate and unequal' entity. As it is, the economic, not to mention political, gap between Vietnam and the other candidates for Asean membership could potentially result in a multi-tiered organization. That would undoubtedly defeat the purpose of widening the Asean circle.

Historical tensions
While the entry of Vietnam into the ranks of Asean is a final affirmation of Asean's closure of its longstanding Cold War-induced conflict with Vietnam over Cambodia, it would be a quantum leap of faith to assume that the historical tension between Thailand and Vietnam will now be a thing of the past.
As the Flor Contemplacion saga between the Philippines and Singapore illustrated, spats could occasionally still arise even among friends. The assertion by a Thai Prime Minister in the early 1990s to turn Indochina into an 'economic battlefield' suggests that competition for influence in what each sees as its legitimate 'backyard' remains. Vietnam's entry into Asean may have only redirected the competition to a more benign area.
Yet the admission of Vietnam into Asean and the keen interest indicated by Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar to follow in Vietnam's footsteps is also a positive affirmation that the benefits and advantages (tangible and otherwise) of Asean membership outweigh any potential drawbacks. In this respect, Vietnam's entry has expanded the potential Asean market to about 420 million people. And when Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar join the ranks of Asean, the Asean Free Trade Area will indeed become a de facto Southeast Asian free trade area. This can only further boost the region's attractiveness for trade and investment as well as put Asean in an even stronger position to deal with extra-Asean trade partners.

The Spratly Islands
On the political and diplomatic fronts, the inclusions of Vietnam and the other Indochinese states as well as Myanmar would further bolster the ability of Asean to deal with extra- regional actors over troublesome issues such as the conflicting claims over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Vietnam's entry into Asean has in essence Asean-ized the dispute over the Spratlys given that malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei are also claimants to parts of the Spratlys, which is claimed in its entirety by China. If Asean chooses to deal with China as a bloc over the Spratlys, the addition of Vietnam cannot but be seen as a 'structural empowerment' of Asean. Such a move is certainly not unprecedented as Asean has taken a similar approach in dealing with Japan and Australia over trade=related issues in the past.
Arguably, the expansion of Asean is perhaps the impetus that the organization needs i order to maintain its raison d'être. And what could be more fitting than to start with Vietnam, its erstwhile regional antagonist for the better part of its existence. In the short term, it allows the original members to act in a bigger arena and may partially deflect the desire by some members to look beyond Asean towards broader regional arrangements. In the long term, an enlarged Asean might serve as a viable 'home base' from which members can either venture into, or retreat from, the international arena depending on the evolving global scenario. Either way, widening the Asean circle is a challenge worthy of an organization which, in the eyes of its detractors, would founder in the post-Cambodia era.

Dr Bilson Kurus is a Visiting Research Associate with the Institute for Development Studies, Sabah, Malaysia.

This article appeared in Trends No.60, August 26-27 1995. Trends is a monthly publication of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, distributed with the Business Times.