The Assertion of the Uzbek National Identity

By Victoria Koroteyeva and Ekaterina Makarova

The process of building the national state is tightly intertwined with the process of building state institutions, which might allow the ruling elites to exercise close control over society. We would like to analyze how successful this policy is at the lowest level of state administration, where state and traditional popular institutions tend to coincide. In Uzbekistan, as in Tajikistan, there were already structures which could serve to underpin the state-building process. However, while Tajikistan has experienced state-building failure, coupled with nation- building failure, Uzbekistan has turned out to be more successful on both accounts. It has much to do with the overall continuity of policy in the post-Independence and post-Soviet period, despite a certain ideological flexibility of the Uzbek leadership. The term 'indigenization' is not used in the official vocabulary. Instead the state prefers to stress the 'restoration of the national tradition'. We will try to show that nation and state-building occurs by appropriating specific local institutions. By doing so, the state alienates other, non-indigenous groups and sets limits to who can be included into the Uzbek nation.
In the course of our fieldwork in Uzbekistan, which started ten years ago, we have been able to observe how the attitude of the Uzbek state towards the most peculiar local institution, the neighbourhood community, has changed. This change reflects the stages of official national assertion in Uzbekistan immediately prior to Independence and in its aftermath.
We will use the example of the malhalla (neighbourhood community) to illustrate how traditional Uzbek institutions have merged with Soviet structures and how this heritage is now mobilized by the modern Uzbek state.
Determining daily life
The neighbourhood community in Uzbekistan is variously called malhalla (mostly among Uzbeks) or guzar (among Tajiks). We will use the Arab term malhalla because it is more widespread and familiar to specialists of Islamic institutions. Being a neighbourhood community in a quarter, the malhalla determines the whole range of social relations of an individual in daily life. It is not a vanishing institution, a simple remnant of the distant past, as is the case in many Muslim countries, but a living unit which even continued to flourish during the Soviet era. The malhalla appears to be a real group, which imposes certain obligations on its members and thus involves them into a web of mutual responsibilities. Every event in the family attracts neighbours, but on major occasions such as weddings or funerals, the whole community assembles. Inevitably this common activity means that all members of the malhalla are involved in material relations; a constant flow of gifts and services. Apart from reliance on personal assistance of neighbours, the family can count on the institutional support of the malhalla as a whole. The malhalla puts a whole range of objects, such as tables, benches and utensils, at the disposal of any member of the community whenever these are needed. If necessary, the tea-house(chaikona) can be used for various communal gatherings. Many valuable services are available within the malhalla itself. One always knows who to invite to pronounce a prayer, to mourn at a funeral, or to circumcise a boy. In exchange for the support and services the malhalla provides for individuals and families, it exacts complete loyalty on their part. Participation in all communal activities, which include not only attending the festivals but also, for example, cleaning streets, guarding the territory at night, assistance in building chaikhona, is obligatory. Every man is expected to provide his services to the malhalla depending on what he can offer. To be excluded from communal life means to be bereft of the support of other people. To find oneself alone in the face of extraordinary circumstances is the greatest threat. The motive " if something happens" is often used when people explain their loyalty to kinship or to the neighbourhood community.

Malhalla as a Soviet institution.
While the malhalla fits the notion of the typical Muslim community of a quarter, the community we found in the mid-1980s can equally be called a typical Soviet bureaucratic institution. It had a formally elected head of community, who was in fact appointed by the regional party committee. A head of a malhalla was assisted by the "malhalla committee" , which was a Soviet creation, though it fitted harmoniously into the traditional form of communal organization. A number of specialized commissions with perfect Soviet labels dealt with such matters as women's problems, veterans' problems, and the organization of family and civic festivals. The malhalla organized ideological campaigns, and lectures on the international situation. The room occupied by the committee was designed using Soviet symbols and hung with portraits of communist leaders. The committee was supposed to provide accounts of its activity to higher Soviet institutions. A special body was created at the district executive committee to coordinate the activity of all malhallas in the territory of the district. While in Soviet times the state was interested in only one aspect of communal life, the ideological one, the new Uzbek state tries to formalize even those aspects of life that usually escaped its control. The malhalla has always been a cell of society, but now attempts are made to make it a cell of the state as well. It is being created in an untraditional setting - in areas with multi-store buildings, and it trends to include even the non-Asian population, for whom this form is unfamiliar. A new unified structure, involving both the city and the village, is being created. State-building, which it is in reality, is legitimated by appeal to popular tradition.
The economic function of the malhalla corresponds to major directions of the state economic policy. In the perestroika years, especially in the closing period, the malhalla committee distributed rationing cards for basic food stuffs. The distribution of goods was organized though local shops, serving the neighbouring malhallas. Thus the malhalla authorities had control over commerce and could do something to remedy for the tendency to divert goods to the black market. When the state started to encourage cooperative enterprises, the malhalla was granted a right to set up its own production units, workshops, and to lease land and buildings to small enterprises. This stage, however, did not last long, as the privileges given to malhalla did not allow the state to tax the newly created production properly. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the local economy and the dramatic drop in living standards of the majority of the local population, the state organized large-scale distribution of social benefits through the malhalla. At present it is one of the most important functions of this institution and the one which gives rise to numerous conflicts. The malhalla committee is supposed to be cognizant of the financial circumstances of different households and to distribute aid according to needs. This, however, turns out to be a very contentious issue.
The malhalla is mobilized every time the state needs reliable information about the inhabitants of the quarter. In Soviet times the malhalla already maintained intensive contacts with local militia. In the case of felony the district militia officer would first contact the malhalla, before starting an official investigation.
Now the malhalla has a right to approve the candidature of a district militia officer. At present the malhalla is involved in the drafting for military service. It registers all the conscripts living in its territory and its representative is present in the district selection committee. A tax inspector will first collect information from the malhalla committee and only then will proceed visit the house.
State politics.
In the period following Independence party politics had almost disappeared. Though the former Communist Party was transformed into the Popular Democratic Party, the merger of the local party and Soviet executive bodies and the creation of the khakimiat as a state executive body made party structures superfluous.
Political propaganda at the local level has also lost its importance. In the previous times each malhalla was attached to a party cell in higher educational institutions, enterprises, or research institutes. Special lecturers were appointed to pass on political propaganda or "enlightenment" to local inhabitants. Now the Popular Democratic Party has resumed to its strategy of grass-roots activity. However, now the stress is put more on so called "spiritual work" rather than direct political propaganda. The party cells in the community organize lectures about prominent figures from national history. Quite recently special events were held in Samarkand to commemorate Timur and others. The malhalla provides other opportunities for state politics, which so far have been underestimated. The polling district could easily coincide with the territory of the malhalla or of a few malhallas and the polling booth could be placed directly in the chaikhona rather than in a state institution, such as a school or a club. The first experiences of organizing elections this way were quite encouraging. As the head of a coordination committee on the malhalla described it: "they are used to coming here (-to the chaikona-) for information and certificates. They will find the way even with their eyes shut".
The new Uzbek state searches for its own identity stressing its distinction mainly from Russia. It is evident that the state is inventing celebration of civic festivals which did not exist before. The major state festival in Uzbekistan at present is the day of Independence (the first of September). As there is still no elaborate scenario of how to hold this festival at the local level, malhallas are encouraged to use customary forms, common for the Soviet festivals, such as sports competitions, non-professional music festivals, chess championships, or mass racing. The malhallas are supposed to make a stand, which should characterize its achievements and celebrate honoured citizens. State sponsorship of popular feasts, especially those that are mostly neutral in their religious content, is another case of the large-scale "invention of tradition". Navruz, a celebration of the New Year in the Iranian tradition has been turned into what is virtually the central state festivity. The way it is organized resembles the Soviet campaigns of the earlier years: thorough planning, agenda, accounts of how it was held in each locality. The scale of celebrations (measured in amount of food cooked) is also submitted for the approval of a higher authority. After the festival, heads of the quarters exchange their experiences in an effort to work out recommendations for improving the ceremony in the future.

"Our nationality"
The attempts to introduce the malhalla and malhalla-activities into new districts of the city (malhallazation as officials call this process) have been fruitful mainly where so-called "local nationalities" live. According to the words of a district-officer responsible for coordination of malhalla activities: "We have prompted them, telling them how to stage the events, for instance Navruz or the Victory day. Representatives of our nationality all have the necessary skills". What is meant here by "our nationality" is not an ethnic group: Uzbeks or Tajiks, but it refers to the native, indigenous population. By the same token our respondents often called themselves "we, nationals', which brings us to a wider question: what does it mean to be an Uzbek and how does the meaning of the term "Uzbek" correspond to various models of nation-building that Uzbekistan might choose?
The stress on local cultural roots is very important in assessing the salience of different forms of self identification in contemporary Central Asia. In Samarkand, for instance, the distinction between "ethnic" Uzbeks and Uzbeks according to the territorial(state) notion of the term is particularly subtle. The Uzbek-Tajik interaction is a case in point. We assume that difference in high culture -one based on Persian, the other on the Turkish language, does not create the ethnic border which would divide the two communities. Both share the same everyday culture in terms of food, clothes, rituals, beliefs. The common religion, Islam, is only a partial explanation for the cultural unity. The Islamic institutions characteristic of urban Uzbeks and Tajiks were traditionally absent in the countryside and were not spread among other Muslim peoples of Central Asia. It is in the sphere of social relations that the search for the roots of common culture is probably the most fruitful. We were interested in how people of Tajik ancestry, who had to be registered as Uzbeks, would designate themselves. Telling their life stories our respondents spontaneously referred to themselves sometimes as Uzbeks, sometimes as Tajiks, without seeing any contradiction in this. They would not deny that their native language was Tajik nor that they grew up in a Tajik environment. One of our respondents explained that if he lived in Tajikistan, he would be a Tajik, but here, in Uzbekistan, he is an Uzbek. We find this a good case for the territorial notion of nationhood. This notion is acceptable to both the state-forming nation and the ethnic minorities which are invited to share in it.
Nonetheless the Uzbek identity apart from the territorial terms could not and cannot be extended to include all ethnic minorities living in Uzbekistan. The case of the Russians is especially evident. Here ethnic identification is strong, and the distinction between Russians and indigenous peoples is obvious. No attempts have ever been made to integrate the whole population of a multi-ethnic republic into the nation. Now the division between the indigenous and the non- indigenous population is even more pronounced. The efforts of the state to mobilize traditional institutions into its own structure may be considered unacceptable by other groups, which are used to relying on more formal ties. If we try to answer the question, stated in the title of our paper, we have to contend that the state-building process in Uzbekistan is simultaneously the process of nativization (indigenization). It is the promotion of local institutions and practices. And those who accept them can claim legitimate membership in the Uzbek nation.

Victoria Koroteyeva and Ekaterina Makarova are affiliated to the Institute of ethnology and anthropology, Moscow