5-7 April, 1995
Japanese-German Center Berlin

Reconsidering the End of World War II and the Change of the World Order

1945 in Europe and Asia

To commemorate the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II scholars from all over Europe (East and West), Russia, North America and East Asia gathered at the Japanese- German Center Berlin (JGCB) in order to 'reconsider the end of World War II and the change of the world order'. The initiative was taken by Dr. Gerhard Krebs of the German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) in Tokyo, who convinced the other German Historical Institutes abroad and the JGCB to conduct this symposium. This was the first time that a joint conference of all Historical Institutes could be organized, and this was largely due to financial support of the Japan Foundation.

by Wolfgang Brenn

In the course of the three days of conference the events before, during and after the year 1945 in approximately twenty countries were analyzed by well-known historians from the countries mentioned. Since space is limited, not all interpretations and narratives can be reported in detail. Instead, I want to highlight some more general thoughts, which emerged as important either because they were mentioned frequently or because they surfaced every now and then.

Planning the post-war period
Prof. Warren F. Kimball of Rutgers University - the first speaker who presented 'Ending' the Second World War: U.S. Wartime Planning for Postwar Germany - reflected the present state of intellectual discussion, not confined to historians, and set the tone for several other presentations, when he argued against "historical inevitability" in the case of the divided Germany: "The end of the Cold War has generated a self-righteous smugness that prompts derisory dismissals of suggestions that a different path might have moved the encounter along less dangerous, less confrontational lines." Similar ideas were raised; amongst other speakers in the case of China by Prof. Chen Jian (State University of New York), when he reported on the welcome the Chinese Communists gave the idea of a US mission to China and Mao's planned visit to Washington in 1944 - which might have led to 'less confrontational lines'. Of course, these kinds of questions were challenged by other scholars, who insisted that historians do not have to ask what might have happened, but have to report on what had happened. Even if the hypothetical question is avoided, the answers and narratives are open to interpretation: no final answers were given to the question 'Was there one war or a war in Europe (one might include Africa) and one in Asia'? Seen from the side of the axis, i.e. Germany and Japan, the two powers' plans to join hands failed and "both sides waged their own wars and both lost separately." (Dr. Krebs) Reflecting on Japanese politics in Indochina after the fall of France in June 1940, Prof. Ving Sinh (University of Alberta) quotes John E. Dreifort: "Never was the interdependence of events in Europe and East Asia more apparent than after June 1940." - Another point in question was, whether World War II ended in 1945, or - taking into consideration the Cold War - has continued up to the present day, Korea for example.
In various presentations (e.g. Thomas A. Schwartz of Vanderbilt University: US Policy in Germany, 1945-1949, Prof. Iokibe Makoto of Kobe University American Presurrender Planning, Japan's Surrender and U.S. Occupation Policy) the immense amount of wartime planning for the post-war period became visible. This was the task of various committees of bureaucrats and, in the case of Britain, as Lothar Kettenacker (German Historical Institute, London) put it: "The approach was strictly technocratic because it was worked out by ministerial and other officials rather than politicians, i.e. excluding all potentially controversial questions." Even the politicians were more often influenced by the events and circumstances (Schwartz) than by policy directions.
How, on the other hand, political directions or their absence could foster circumstances that eventually produced historical trends can be seen in the case of Korea, presented by Prof. Lee Chong-Sik (University of Pennsylvania). The disinterest of the US in the Korean Peninsula and the lack of any clear idea of what should happen there at the end of the war offered Stalin, who 'had no intention of militarily challenging the United States for at least twenty years', 'an opportunity too attractive to ignore'. 'The fateful decision to attack the orphaned South Korea in June 1950, accelerated the arms race that eventually brought his empire down.'
Prof. Nish (LSE) and others challenged the view that 'Japan unleashed the forces of nationalism in Southeast Asia'. He argued that 'in many ways they unleashed themselves.' The role of the Japanese occupation differed widely from country to country. While the nationalists co-operated closely with the Japanese occupiers in Java and Sumatra, the Japanese faced stiff resistance in the Philippines.

Japan and Russia
Japan-Russian relations were a case for a special controversy: Dr. Boris Slavinsky (Far Eastern Affairs Journal, Moscow) claimed that Japan and Russia 'have already exhausted themselves' in solving the Kuril Islands problem and arriving at a peace treaty. He suggested the 'USA should show the initiative in calling the Far Eastern Commission, which drew up the occupation policy of allies and where the Peace Treaty with Japan was prepared. At the Conference it may be possible to clear the way for signing the Peace Treaty between Russia and Japan.' This position was challenged by a high ranking Japanese official attending the conference, who gave his personal account of the history of the Northern Territories. Theoretically a conference could be called, but in his opinion the bilateral possibilities are not exhausted, though the present domestic situation in Russia is not favourable to finding a solution. Therefore it might be advisable for Japan to support the transformation process in Russia.

The papers of the conference will be published by ludicium Verlag Munich.



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