Reconsidering the End of World War II and the Change of the World Order
by Wolfgang Brenn
In the course of the three days of conference the events before, during and after the year 1945 in approximately twenty countries were analyzed by well-known historians from the countries mentioned. Since space is limited, not all interpretations and narratives can be reported in detail. Instead, I want to highlight some more general thoughts, which emerged as important either because they were mentioned frequently or because they surfaced every now and then.
Planning the post-war period
Prof. Warren F. Kimball of Rutgers University - the first speaker who presented
'Ending' the Second World War: U.S. Wartime Planning for Postwar
Germany - reflected the present state of intellectual discussion, not confined to
historians, and set the tone for several other presentations, when he argued against
"historical inevitability" in the case of the divided Germany: "The end of the Cold War
has generated a self-righteous smugness that prompts derisory dismissals of suggestions
that a different path might have moved the encounter along less dangerous, less
confrontational lines." Similar ideas were raised; amongst other speakers in the case of
China by Prof. Chen Jian (State University of New York), when he reported on the
welcome the Chinese Communists gave the idea of a US mission to China and Mao's
planned visit to Washington in 1944 - which might have led to 'less confrontational lines'.
Of course, these kinds of questions were challenged by other scholars, who insisted that
historians do not have to ask what might have happened, but have to report on what had
happened.
Even if the hypothetical question is avoided, the answers and narratives are open to
interpretation: no final answers were given to the question 'Was there one war or a war
in Europe (one might include Africa) and one in Asia'? Seen from the side of the axis,
i.e. Germany and Japan, the two powers' plans to join hands failed and "both sides waged
their own wars and both lost separately." (Dr. Krebs) Reflecting on Japanese politics in
Indochina after the fall of France in June 1940, Prof. Ving Sinh (University of Alberta)
quotes John E. Dreifort: "Never was the interdependence of events in Europe and East
Asia more apparent than after June 1940." - Another point in question was, whether
World War II ended in 1945, or - taking into consideration the Cold War - has continued
up to the present day, Korea for example.
In various presentations (e.g. Thomas A. Schwartz of Vanderbilt University: US
Policy in Germany, 1945-1949, Prof. Iokibe Makoto of Kobe University American
Presurrender Planning, Japan's Surrender and U.S. Occupation Policy) the
immense amount of wartime planning for the post-war period became visible. This was
the task of various committees of bureaucrats and, in the case of Britain, as Lothar
Kettenacker (German Historical Institute, London) put it: "The approach was strictly
technocratic because it was worked out by ministerial and other officials rather than
politicians, i.e. excluding all potentially controversial questions." Even the politicians
were more often influenced by the events and circumstances (Schwartz) than by policy
directions.
How, on the other hand, political directions or their absence could foster circumstances
that eventually produced historical trends can be seen in the case of Korea, presented by
Prof. Lee Chong-Sik (University of Pennsylvania). The disinterest of the US in the
Korean Peninsula and the lack of any clear idea of what should happen there at the end of
the war offered Stalin, who 'had no intention of militarily challenging the United States
for at least twenty years', 'an opportunity too attractive to ignore'. 'The fateful decision
to attack the orphaned South Korea in June 1950, accelerated the arms race that
eventually brought his empire down.'
Prof. Nish (LSE) and others challenged the view that 'Japan unleashed the forces of
nationalism in Southeast Asia'. He argued that 'in many ways they unleashed themselves.'
The role of the Japanese occupation differed widely from country to country. While the
nationalists co-operated closely with the Japanese occupiers in Java and Sumatra, the
Japanese faced stiff resistance in the Philippines.
Japan and Russia
Japan-Russian relations were a case for a special controversy: Dr. Boris Slavinsky (Far
Eastern Affairs Journal, Moscow) claimed that Japan and Russia 'have already exhausted
themselves' in solving the Kuril Islands problem and arriving at a peace treaty. He
suggested the 'USA should show the initiative in calling the Far Eastern Commission,
which drew up the occupation policy of allies and where the Peace Treaty with Japan was
prepared. At the Conference it may be possible to clear the way for signing the Peace
Treaty between Russia and Japan.' This position was challenged by a high ranking
Japanese official attending the conference, who gave his personal account of the history of
the Northern Territories. Theoretically a conference could be called, but in his opinion
the bilateral possibilities are not exhausted, though the present domestic situation in
Russia is not favourable to finding a solution. Therefore it might be advisable for Japan to
support the transformation process in Russia.
The papers of the conference will be published by ludicium Verlag Munich.
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