Chinese Propaganda Posters: from revolution to modernization

Ever since the founding of the CCP in 1920, propaganda posters had played an important role in spreading the Party's ideology and policy blueprints. Their origins can be traced to pre-modern, popular printed materials, such as charms and New Year prints (nianhua). From 1940 on, the CCP decided to secularize these prints, which often had a magical property in the eyes of the people, and to use them for political propaganda. To this end, gouaches, oil paintings, water colours, brush and ink drawings, and woodblock prints were translated into lithographic propaganda prints, or posters, which were mass-produced and widely sold to a mass audience. In the 1950s and 1960s, and in particular during the 'Cultural Revolution' (1966-1976), such propaganda posters became an integral element of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) political culture.
At the end of the 1970s, the CCP faced a number of propaganda problems. This was not only a consequence of the adaptation of the 'Four Modernizations,' but also of the lingering after-effects of the often disastrous mass campaigns of the preceding decades. How should appropriate behaviour in a society that was turning away from the ideological straitjacket of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, in the direction of more capitalist-inspired and - oriented methods be visualized? How could the 'crisis of faith' in the CCP be turned around, thus ensuring the continued legitimacy of its rule?

Trains, planes and automobiles
As a consequence of the depoliticization of society that took place in the wake of the decision to modernize, the general tone of posters was softened, became less militarized, and less intrusive. More attention was paid to inculcating courteous behaviour, patriotism, and other qualities. On the whole, this type of propaganda was opposed to the posters of the past, which had sought to arouse the people and mobilize them to take part in certain actions. Posters with an explicit political message practically disappeared, with the exception of some that stressed adherence to general political themes. "Safe" subjects, like economic performance and production, were stressed in order to generate popular support for the recreation of a "rich and strong motherland". The economic rehabilitation of the country became the focus of propaganda. Tanned and muscular labourers were no longer portrayed building a proletarian utopia; instead, Western icons of progress and development were employed: high-speed bullet trains, spacecraft, highrise buildings, gridlocked freeways and projections of general affluence. But for some reason, this new approach to propaganda did not lead to the same popular response as it had done in the past.
As the ownership of televisions spread as a result of the increased prosperity of the population, the CCP correctly interpreted the image of modernity that TV had in the eyes of the people, and grasped the opportunities this medium offered dealing with the propaganda problems it faced. It therefore concentrated on utilizing it, in such a manner that the posters practically disappeared. There can be no doubt that the pattern of communication between CCP and population changed as a result of this.
But this pattern also had to change, as modernization accelerated the pace of life in Chinese society in general. However, the CCP misread the fact that television contents are generally multi-layered, and leave plenty of room for alternative interpretations of a message, a situation that obviously did not exist when posters were one of the few ways to visualize desired behaviour or modes of thought. Furthermore, by importing foreign television series, the population was provided with alternative glimpses of reality. These could and did harm the 'official' interpretation of reality as it continued to be provided by the CCP's monopoly on information.

TV rules
TV, then, has become the medium for propaganda and attitudinal indications of the late 1980s and early 1990s. China Central Television even produces programmes featuring models presenting behaviour that is intended to be emulated. Through TV, the message is communicated more quickly; the impression it leaves is more fleeting, leading to "institutionalized amnesia" that can be employed successfully. After the Tian'anmen Incident of 1989, posters reappeared for a short time, featuring the qualities of obedience and discipline as espoused by the often used model soldier Lei Feng and others. After a few years, they disappeared again, no doubt as a consequence of the more reform-oriented practices of Deng Xiaoping's 'Southern Inspection Tour' in 1992.
Posters, on the other hand, have returned to their traditional, non-secularized roots, although they have adopted a modernized guise. One of the most interesting New Year prints published in 1993, featured the traditional good-luck symbols of the gods of happiness, emoluments and longevity. Attention, however, is drawn to the centre of the print: stacks of 50 and 100 yuan RMB bills, and a sizeable stack of American $100 bills. The production of visual materials that are significant in the eyes of the consumers, moreover, is increasingly in the hands of artists who are not employed by the State and who basically produce what the public wants. It is obvious that the Chinese, having become more knowledgable about the world surrounding them, are no longer buying the messages presented by the Party in its propaganda art.
Lavishly illustrated in colour and black-and-white, Stefan Landsberger's Chinese Propaganda Posters - From Revolution to Modernization traces the development of the style and content of the Chinese propaganda poster in the decade of reform, from its traditional origins to its use as a tool for political and economic purposes.

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