Generals & Scholars
The
Koryo(breve) dynasty (918-1392) is currently enjoying renewed popularity
in Korea as a subject of historical research. The period of military rule
(1170-1270), however, is still more or less neglected. The late eleventh
and early twelfth centuries saw impressive cultural achievements on the
Korean peninsula. It was an age of intellectual activity, bustling commerce,
and able diplomacy. Koryo(breve) military power was also at its height,
as is exemplified by the territorial integrity that it succeeded in maintaining
despite the strong presence of the Liáo and Jž¯n dynasties
in the north. It offers a stark contrast with the late twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, a time usually portrayed by focusing on the many revolts, internal
strife, and the repeated Mongol incursions that devastated Koryo(breve).
* By REMCO BREUKER
The reign of King U(breve)ijong (r. 1146 - 1170) was dramatically cut short by a coup of disgruntled military officials led by General Cho(breve)ng Chungbu, who allegedly wanted satisfaction for the unspeakable insult he had suffered when a high-ranking civil official burnt his beard. It was the culmination of years of insults to military officials. The coup meant the end of civilian rule in Koryo(breve) and ushered in a tumultuous period that reached its climax during the dictatorship of the Ch'oe House (1196-1258).
The historical verdict of the military period has been unanimously negative. The fifteenth-century Koryo(breve) sa (History of Koryo(breve)) relegated the military rulers to the section devoted to national traitors, a judgement that has been reinforced by later generations of historians. The negativity of this verdict is reflected in the small number of pages this period occupies in most historical works. It is only during the last three decades that ideas about the military period have started to become more balanced, as research into it has been expanding.
Edward Shultz sets out to reinforce this trend in his Generals and Scholars: Military Rule in Medieval Korea. Research on Koryo(breve) in Western languages, and the study of the military period in particular, is still severely limited. Shultz, however, provides a sorely needed English-language analysis on this crucial period and offers a constructive understanding of it. His approach to the period focuses on the institutional aspects of military rule in Koryo(breve). Contrary to the established belief that this period represented a break with the traditions of dynastic Koryo(breve), he grasps the significance of the period - and in particular the rule of the Ch'oe House - in terms of innovation within tradition. He draws attention not only to the radical changes and cruelties of the times but, at the same time, puts these in perspective by observing the continuing traditions.
Shultz's study is primarily a study of Koryo(breve) history, but he carefully situates the military period in East Asian medieval history. Comparisons with literati rule in contemporaneous Sung China and military rule in Kamakura Japan not only highlight the different circumstances in Koryo(breve), but also draw attention to the wider perspective of the development of rule in East Asia during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
The book begins with a thorough analysis of the circumstances that led to the military coup. Years of neglect of meritorious service and anti-military discrimination finally took their toll in 1170. The subsequent coup aggravated the country's administrative and financial difficulties. It catapulted the country into a state of chaos in which a number of generals alternately took charge of the government. A semblance of order was finally restored in 1196 when general Ch'oe Chungho(breve)n executed his coup.
Through thorough and balanced research, Shultz relates in chapter two Ch'oe's controlled and patient attempts to consolidate his power. He repudiates the widespread notion of the leaders of the Ch'oe as violent and unwise rulers. The main point of Shultz's book lies in his analysis of the institutional innovations of the Ch'oe. The research underlying this part of the book (chapters three, four, and five) shows Shultz's excellent knowledge of the sources available, his familiarity with past and current Korean historiographical debates, and his skills in analysing and putting together the material. Shultz points out that although Chungho(breve)n may have been the de facto leader of Koryo(breve), his authority was far from stable. Ch'oe responded to the instability by maintaining strong private forces, a recent phenomenon in Koryo(breve). He further made only very prudent advances in Koryo(breve)'s complicated bureaucracy, so as to avoid offending tradition. It is to Shultz's credit that he clearly shows the double administrative structure that Ch'oe created in order to consolidate the power of his clan. This dual structure was characterized by a strong military presence of private forces and Ch'oe-dominated, semi-dynastic offices, which had been expanded to become the pinnacles of policy making in Koryo(breve).
Another aspect of the conservative slant of the Ch'oe rule was evident in its social policy. Chungho(breve)n was committed to relieving the misery of the peasant class, arguably the class that suffered most from the upheavals caused by twenty years of military misrule, but he nonetheless strictly guarded Koryo(breve)'s social boundaries, making it all but impossible for lowborn people to advance beyond their social station (chapter six).
Chungho(breve)n's son, U, more or less adhered to his father's policies and allowed the dual structure to mature. He was able to afford himself more leeway, both administratively and financially, because of the high degree of stabilization Ch'oe power had realized. Shultz rightly emphasizes the role civilians played in this structure. Decision-making power was in military hands, but the majority of higher officials were civilians, most of whom had passed the state examinations. Through the active patronizing of learning and the promotion of state examinations, the Ch'oe not only stayed in touch with the young literati, but also fostered a sense of loyalty towards the Ch'oe among them.
Another valuable aspect of Shultz's study is the analysis of the Ch'oe retainer system - a new phenomenon in Koryo(breve). Comparing it to the very different contemporaneous Japanese system, he concludes that the retainer system was personal, in the sense that loyalty could not be transferred to another person of the Ch'oe House. This is exemplified by the large purges of trusted retainers that accompanied each transfer of power. In Japan, a system developed that reserved the ultimate loyalty of a retainer for his master, while the Ch'oe retainer still owed his ultimate loyalty to the king according to the Confucian ideology. This did not become a problem when Ch'oe rule was strong, but the potential for competing allegiances was always present.
Ch'oe power was consolidated during the rule of U. The Ch'oe would face an enormous challenge, however, in the devastating Mongol invasions that began in 1231. U's rule proved strong enough to withstand the Mongol onslaught through the introduction of several policies. The rule of Hang, U's son, is where Shultz sees a clear break within the history of Ch'oe rule. In contrast to his grandfather and father, Hang was not a gifted politician. He only managed to stay in power because of the strength of the institutional innovations that were in place by then. The ongoing Mongol invasions proved too much to withstand and by the time his son, U(breve)i, took over, Ch'oe power had eroded to such an extent that U(breve)i was assassinated soon after he assumed power.
Shultz's analysis clearly brings out the inner mechanisms of Ch'oe rule. He particularly describes the first two generations of Ch'oe rulers as abler and less arbitrary than they are usually portrayed. The merits of this approach undoubtedly outweigh its weaknesses, but the emphasis on the institutional history of the Ch'oe House has resulted in a relative neglect of the influence of outside factors, such as the Mongol invasions. A more elaborate treatment of these invasions might have yielded some more insights into Ch'oe rule.
The institutional analysis is complemented by extensive analyses of Buddhism and the land system - the basis of the economic system - under Ch'oe rule (chapters eight and nine). The relationship with the powerful Buddhist temples was initially very troublesome. The Buddhist elite saw their vested interests erode and frequently revolted. Consequently, the Ch'oes invested much in the relationship with the minority Meditation (So(breve)n) School at the initial expense of the Doctrine (Kyo) School that had always maintained close ties with the royal house. The one thing missing here is an in-depth examination of the carving of the Tripitaka. This sixteen-year project took place during the Mongol invasions and was sponsored by the Ch'oe. It was hence done mainly in the southern part of the peninsula where the Ch'oe had built their power base. How the authority of the Ch'oe House extended to the provinces and how it worked with the Buddhist establishment still needs to be examined in more detail.
The study of the land system under the Ch'oe fits nicely into Shultz's institutional analysis. Under Chungho(breve)n and U, the existing system was reorganized and reinforced. At the same time, they took care of their economic base by circumventing the regular dynastic routes for revenue and collecting taxes directly. The decline of Ch'oe rule, however, brought with it the collapse of the land system and the loss of revenue for the state when large tracts of land reverted to individual ownerships.
In the end, Ch'oe rule collapsed under its own weight. The dual structure of competing dynastic and private institutions no longer functioned under the pressure of the Mongol invasions. Ch'oe rule stood and fell with its leader since the position itself had no inherent authority. When its leadership devolved into a weak and inexperienced youth in the person of U(breve)i, it could not but collapse.
Generals and Scholars is without doubt a landmark in the study of the military period and Koryo(breve) in general. It makes available in English an outstanding analysis of this period, which has been underrated with regard to its historical importance and has often been characterized as an anomaly. The experiment of military rule in Korea ultimately failed, but it underscored the unique characteristics of Koryo(breve) society. Shultz convincingly shows that this period was anything but an anomaly and succeeds in according it the historical significance it deserves. The quality of the analysis is sustained by his excellent knowledge of the sources and of both Korean and Western historiography of this period. The criticisms that can be made are minor. Some analyses could have been extended and the absence of a glossary is unfortunate. This does not detract, however, from the major accomplishment this study represents. It is required reading for students of Korean history, as well as for students of medieval Chinese and Japanese history. Generals and Scholars is of great importance to the understanding of a decisive period in Korean history. It is thorough, well written, and rich in new insights. *
- Shultz, Edward J., Generals and Scholars: Military Rule
in Medieval Korea. University of Hawai'i Press: Honolulu. 2000. 254 pp,
ISBN 0-8248-2324-9 (pb).
Remco Breuker, MA had obtained his Master's in both Japanese Studies and Korean Studies at Leiden University. His current research is into the history of the Koryo(breve) Dynasty (918-1392) at Seoul National University with a Korean ministry of education scholarship.
E-mail: rbreuker@hotmail.com