Milestones of Peace and Reconciliation
The moving scenes of long separated families being briefly reunited, then separated again, marked a poignant milestone on the road to peace and reconciliation on the Korean peninsula. The family reunions were, for most Koreans, the first tangible results of the June summit in Pyongyang between the leaders of the two Koreas. This perception was not quite correct, in that the highly successful debut of the North Korean Foreign Minister, Paek Nam Sun, at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Bangkok at the end of July was an important achievement in what has become a 'de facto' joint offensive of President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong Il to establish diplomatic relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and those allies of the Republic of Korea (ROK) who have yet to do so.
By TIM BEAL
Nevertheless, the family reunions were visible proof that the peace process is moving ahead. This sign of progress is vitally important, because hopes have been dashed before. There have been family reunions and high-level talks in the past, but little has been achieved. Will this time lead, in Kim Dae-jung's phrase, to the waters of prosperity filling the Han and Taedong Rivers or will it be, as Aidan Foster-Carter suggested last year, another 'Groundhog Day' scenario, where things go 'round and 'round, changing but never resolving?However, this time is different for two reasons. The first is the obvious one that the June summit in Pyongyang, and promises of rapprochement, political and economic co-operation, and progress towards reunification have been very publicly endorsed by the leaders of both sides, who have unequivocally displayed their commitment. In Korean political culture this carries a lot of weight. We have never got to this stage before.
The second reason is more complicated and revolves around the basic hypothesis that all the leading players North and South Korea, the US, Japan, China and Russia have an interest in supporting rapprochement as outlined by the summit. This does not mean that all political forces in those countries are in favour far from it but that, for the moment at least, the dominant forces are. The public commitment of Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong Il is built upon this foundation and whilst we should not underestimate the personal commitment, certainly of Kim DJ and perhaps of Kim JI, that would not have gotten very far without the development of circumstances conducive to rapprochement.
All Korean politicians claim to be committed to working for reunification and, although there are reports from the South that young people are showing little interest in joining with the North, it is clear that the issue of division and the goal of unity remain in the forefront of public consciousness, especially this year. Until recently, the conditions of reunification were, of course, contested between North and South but now the leaders of both sides appear to be edging towards an understanding.
At the time of the July 4 statement in 1972, both Koreas were secure in defence but the DPRK was, by accounts, economically ahead of the ROK. By the time of the 1991/2 prime ministerial meetings, the DPRK was slipping into crisis and, whilst now it is recovering, it is immensely weaker across the board than the ROK. However, if the DPRK has long since given up thoughts of taking over the South (despite the assertions from outside to the contrary) so too has the ROK given up a desire to swallow the North. The German example put paid to that. From the point of view of the dominating side, the costs were enormous and Kim Dae-jung, amongst others, has shown he is well aware of that. From the perspective of the weaker side, especially the ten to fifteen percent of the country who are identified with the regime or are in positions of authority or have skills that will become inadequate, the prospects in such a reunified country are dim. Moreover, whilst in Germany state-to-state relations were frosty, in Korea there has been a fratricidal civil war between the two sides and there would be pressures for revenge and retribution.
If neither side can contemplate taking over the other or being taken over, but the imperative of reunification remains, then a living together and developing of co-operation is logical. From the point of view of the North, the rapprochement is of huge importance. The DPRK needs to restore its economy and, most crucially, to increase its earning of foreign exchange greatly. Rapprochement with the South is vital, for reasons of direct economic co-operation, for access to international loans, and for the knock-on effect of removing U.S. sanctions and getting Japanese reparations. The economic attractions for the South are far less, but still substantial.
However, it would be a mistake to see this as all a one-way business. The ROK has the economic and military edge, but the DPRK has the card of Korean nationalism. This gives it strength vis-a-vis the South and its other adversaries and also provides the regime with legitimacy and resilience. It has often been argued that the parlous economic situation would 'bring North Korea to the negotiating table'; however, the opposite has happened. It is the beginnings of economic recovery and a confidence that the worst is over, that powerful enemies had been faced down and forced to negotiate, that led Kim Jong Il to the June summit.
The great change in DPRK strategy over the last year has been a turning away from its traditional insistence that its main negotiations were with the United States, to a focus on Seoul. There are a number of possible reasons for this, but the key seems to have been that Kim Jong Il was persuaded that Kim Dae-jung's 'sunshine policy' was more than a trick and offered real opportunities for achieving what must be his two main objects the survival and security from outside threat of the DPRK, and the restoration of its economy.
One crucial aspect was Seoul's encouragement for its allies to establish relations with Pyongyang. Italy's recognition in January 2000 and Australia's re-establishment of relations in May, ties with the Philippines and admission to the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the subsequent agreements with Canada and New Zealand, owed much to Seoul's support. It seems that Pyongyang decided, quite rightly, that all other relations at the moment turned on the relationship with Kim Dae-jung.
Kim Dae-jung is clearly pivotal in the whole business. Not merely has his 'sunshine policy' brought about a climate for rapprochement, but it has become the centre-point of his political life. It has been suggested that he is in the running for a Nobel peace prize (along with Kim Jong Il) if things go well. Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume that he will want to go down in history as the man who brought about the reunification of his country, so he will devote himself to making the summit work. He also has a commitment to democracy and a track record that few could match, and progress in deepening South Korean democracy will depend crucially on relations with the North. Rescinding of the National Security Law will be the touchstone of that. Moreover, the setback in the April elections left relations with the North as one of the few areas where Kim DJ has a relatively free hand. He has to watch his back because, although the summit has in theory bipartisan support, the opposition Grand National Party has lost no opportunity to score points. Nevertheless, as president, Kim has a special role to play and it is clear he will use that.
All this is reinforced by the reception he received in Pyongyang, the Confucian deference shown to him by Kim Jong Il, and the personal rapport the two seem to have established. The momentum of the June summit has been kept up in a series of high-level talks, family reunions, repatriation of political prisoners, forthcoming re-joining of the railway systems, developing economic ties, and various other milestones that give a real sense of progress towards peace and reconciliation.
Nevertheless, there are many things that could go wrong, and many covert forces that would like to bring that about. It is important, therefore, that the process receives as much support as possible from the outside world. In particular, the European Union and its constituent countries should join with Italy in speedily establishing diplomatic relations with the DPRK and developing aid and business relations. *
This is an updated and reduced version of a paper entitled 'Summit of High Hopes' which introduced the Special Supplement on Korea in the New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, Vol 2 No 1, June 2000. Details of the journal may be found at the website of the NZ Asian Studies Society (http://www.nzasia.waikato.ac.nz/). The original paper, and others on North Korea, along with links to documents and press stories, can be found at: Http://www.vuw.ac.nz/˜caplabtb/ dprk/index.html.
For economic developments see Tim Beal, The Waters of Prosperity will fill the Han and Taedong Rivers, NZ journal of Asian Studies, June 2000, pp. 287-319; also at: Http://www.vuw.ac.nz/˜caplabtb/ dprk/index.html.
Dr Tim Beal is Senior Lecturer at the School of Business and Public Management, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.
Email: tim.beal@vuw.ac.nz