Indonesia on the Threshold
Towards an ethnification of the nation?
Because of the fluidity and thus the political potential of ethnicity many states perceive ethnic groups as a threat to national unity. Depending on the organization of the state, the ideological aspect of it is generally open to accommodate alternative identities found within the national hinterland. This is an acknowledgement of the state's limited ability to control ethnicity and the latter's resilience towards state elite's attempts to transform or control it. Not open to discussion, however, is the state's perception of having the exclusive or sovereign right to manipulate those ideologies and to enforce its interpretation, if need be. In this sense, the claim to sovereignty is of utmost importance for the state, because being a 'true' sovereign state implies being the sole organizer of the national community.
By MICHAEL JACOBSEN
From an international perspective, does this perception of state sovereignty still hold? To be a successful player on the contemporary global scene there appear to be certain rules that have to be followed, especially those stressing economic transparency and good governance in a country's internal affairs. Furthermore, a serious global player assumes a willingness to relinquish aspects of sovereignty to the international community by, for example, allowing institutions such as the IMF, WTO, ILO, and the UN to intervene in national political and economic policies.Furthermore, states must increasingly relinquish part of their sovereignty to the international human rights regime, especially in the monitoring of states' dealings with minority groups and human rights abuses. For example, various international human rights organisations have been scrutinizing how the Indonesian state deals with different types of domestic unrest.
The Minahasa of North Sulawesi represent one of the internal forces challenging the contemporary state's perception that it is the sole organiser of the nation. One of the most important developments since May 1988 has been the decentralization process. President Abdurrahman Wahid has even hinted at implementing federalism but, at present, the hot topic is the consequences of decentralization and regional autonomy for national coherence.
Fluid ethnicity
For many Indonesians, the movement from an authoritarian society towards a decentralized democracy is affecting their self-perception. This is especially true of outer Indonesia where many movements based on a combination of ethnic and religious affiliation have begun to reconsider their cultural backgrounds. This has unleashed ethnic and religious turbulence in many parts of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, Lombok, and Papua. These developments have not yet reached Minahasa, but people there intensively discuss events in Maluku and elsewhere in Indonesia and speculate about the effects on themselves.
The Minahasans are very critical of the New Order regime, especially in terms of what they call a Javanization of Indonesia and the suppression of ethnic sentiments. Many feel that they have been cheated by the New Order, especially with regard to identity. Current changes in Indonesia cause Minahasans to question their identity, even to reinterpret it in order to preserve their cultural specificity.
Informants describe contemporary Minahasa ethnicity as consisting of ascribed and locally perceived characteristics. It changes in content according to time and place, and in its terms of references according to who is defining what Minahasan identity is, where and when. Minahasans might thus refer to different matters that transcend, for example, language borders or local perceptions of culture and traditions when evaluating their identity. Throughout the Kabupaten, irrespective of different perspectives on identity, all Minahasans are united by the umbrella concept of Minahasa ethnicity. Minahasa ethnicity is thus not static and monolithic but fluid, consisting of several layers of explanation.
Double blindfold
This fluidity constitutes a double blindfold that frustrates Minahasans' efforts to probe into their identity and prevents clear and critical insight into how a new identity can be suited to accommodate a restructuring Indonesia. The first blindfold is Christianity. During the last two centuries missionaries have not only effectively eradicated every aspect of Minahasa 'lived' culture (value systems and material culture), but have also replaced a Minahasa perception of cultural specificity with that of Christian ethical values. Pre-colonial societies were stigmatized as being irreconcilable with a righteous Christian, thus Western way of life. Under such conditions, remnants of the pre-colonial societies have gradually been transformed into mythological stories, curious animistic rituals, and colourful performances for official occasions.
Golkar stronghold
The second blindfold is the New Order's nationalist ideology in which indigenous cultures exemplify the national motto: 'Diversity in Unity'. Notably, only the performative aspects of local cultures are allowed, not those that could jeopardize the indoctrination of the Pancasila ideals. To underpin this ideology, the complementary concept of Pembangunan allied with a more tangible administrative and military command structure was introduced. For many ethnic groups throughout New Order Indonesia, resistance was difficult. But for the Minahasa, this did not pose a great problem as the missionaries had already paved the way by removing the 'dangerous' aspects of pre-colonial Minahasa culture(s). The Christian ethic and a Western way of life perfectly suited both Pancasila and Pembangunan ideology. Therefore, it is not difficult to understand why Minahasa became a Golkar stronghold.
Arguably, ethnicity can be perceived as a dynamic, organizing construct that superimposes its framework on a social organization, thereby co-ordinating interaction within that organization. As such, ethnicity entails a consciousness of difference. Some authors distinguish between 'low' and 'high' degrees of such consciousness. With a 'low' degree, cultural differences tend to be marked and inter-ethic relations are relatively stable: people accept differences, hardly take time to reflect on them and there is no pronounced ethnic ideology, let alone a movement. When a 'high' degree prevails, however, interaction increases and people lose, or fear they will lose, their cultural distinctiveness. They become more aware of their culture, and may start to 'repair' or reinvent it and demand cultural and political rights of the state.
The Minahasans are currently traversing this continuum as a result of national restructuring. They are now reorganizing their culture in order to formulate a policy of cultural rights. Presently in Minahasa, an illusive identity, dominated as it is by Christianity and New Order ideologies, is gradually changing into a more culturally sensitive identity.
The question is, will such an invigorated identity be used in a local political context? Will it become radicalized in relation to Muslims, making them wary of a possible forced exodus thereby creating the potential for inter-ethnic-cum-religious clashes like those in Maluku?
Globalization
Taking the distribution of political power in the province into account, I am convinced that this development is closely linked to politics. Although they are a majority in Kabupaten Minahasa, Minahasans constitute a minority in North Sulawesi Province. A culturally reinforced Minahasa identity would be a perfect new political platform for Minahasa politicians to advocate in a decentralizing Indonesia. Cultural revival thus constitutes an impetus for invigorating Minahasa as a political community. Economically, they are being pressed by Chinese and Muslim businessmen both from the inside and outside the Kabupaten. If Minahasans maintain political sway in the province, then they also have control over the use and allocation of economic assets in North Sulawesi Province. This becomes more important when political and economical decentralization is implemented throughout Indonesia, resulting in an economic system designed to back up the political power in each rejuvenated province.
On the national level, some aspects in the relationship between the state and ethnic groups in outer Indonesia have a potential influence on the formation of the new Indonesia. Arguably, processes of globalization are leading towards an assertive resurgence of local identities producing increasing social and political awareness. Furthermore, globalization is promoting a supranational moral construct in which human rights play a major role.
Together these effects constitute the beginning and the end of an interrelated movement. NGOs and ethnic groups can now press issues on an international level, thus catalyzing change in people's lives at a local level.
Processes of globalization have also, however, distressed ethnic groups into thinking that their identity is being watered down and creolised beyond recognition through participation in different cultural practices, patterns of consumption and life styles together with international perceptions of moral values. Recognizing this, people cleave to their culture of origin in order to maintain their understanding of identity, not in the sense of returning to a dogmatic reading of cultural history, but rather by filtering external cultural influences into their own domestic version.
An ironically reinforcing bond between local identities and international normative patterns is the result, leaving the state on the sideline. The Indonesian state cannot suppress ethnic groups by military force without attracting immediate negative attention of the international community, which considers a separate ethnic identity to be legitimate next to a national one. Moreover, as human rights recently constitutes part of IMFs humanitarian platform, the Indonesian government is forced to initiate policies that guarantee the right of ethnic groups to participate in the current restructuring of the Indonesian State and nation. Thus, ethnic groups have secured, at least theoretically, international support in their jockeying for cultural recognition and political influence.
What is the role, then, of invigorated ethnic groups in post-Soeharto Indonesia? Will we be witnessing a shift in power relations between inner and outer Indonesia with a federal-like society on the horizon? Provided with a higher degree of political and economical autonomy, many ethnic groups who are the original owners of certain natural resources of vital importance to the Indonesian economy suddenly find themselves as having real possibilities for reinforcing a powerful position against the Indonesian authorities. These resources will certainly represent bargaining chips in negotiations with the contemporary weakened Indonesian State. *
Dr Michael Jacobsen,
Nordic-Netherlands Research Fellow, International Institute for Asian Studies.
E-mail: mjacobsen@let.leidenuniv.nl