Qigong Groups and Civil Society in P.R. China
As I was in China in July 1999 when the political campaign was launched against the 'Falun gong' movement, Qigong of 'The Wheel of the Law', I decided to follow the event which was given wide media coverage and to update my data on Qigong practices, focusing on their social significance. I began doctoral research work on Qigong health practices in the early 1990s. I have done extensive fieldwork and published a number of articles on the subject.
By EVELYNE MICOLLIER
Nowadays, social and political stakes related to Qigong appear to be of outstanding importance with the rise of ongoing persistent political campaign against the Falun gong group and most recently against the Zhong gong (Dec. 5, 1999). I recorded the official discourse on TV, radio broadcast and press, while I maintained contact with some Qigong groups with which I worked as a participant observer a number of years ago. In this article I shall discuss the state discourse on Qigong, and the social organization of Qigong groups in the context of emerging Chinese civil society.Qigong is a 'neo-traditional' set of health practices and beliefs which is difficult to fit into pre-constructed categories: 'Qigong, traditional Chinese slow-motion exercises used for physical fitness and for healing, cannot be classified either as a religion or superstition, but because of its current popularity and its religious origins, it is mentioned here as a religious surrogate' (MacInnis 1989: 120-121). The Qigong craze may be measured by the diversity of forms of Qigong health practices, by the various forms of social organization shaping Qigong groups, the eclectism of membership in terms of social class, level of education and motives, and the blossoming of publications, audiotapes, and videotapes aiming at both academic and popular audiences. As official figures are not at all reliable, the total number of Qigong groups is unknown, as is the number of practitioners making up one group, not to mention the total number of all Qigong practitioners: for instance, the government's own estimates of Falun gong membership outnumbered the 55 million-strong Communist Party in April (Asian Wall Street, April 26), and was revised down to a mere 2 million in November (Inside China website, Reuters, Nov.12). These puzzling figures may not be linked only to a politically motivated official discourse, but may also be explained by the nature itself of Qigong groups and their membership, showing flexibility in the methods of working and a whole range in the levels of members' involvement. That could partly explain why these groups are perceived by the government as a big threat, which feels threatened by their facility in building up informal networks and social organizations which cannot be controlled. Li Hongzhi, the exiled leader of Falun gong currently residing in New York, has always claimed that his movement was not organized and was not stricto sensu an organization, as the activities of the group consist only of informal collective gatherings in public spaces with the aim of practising meditation to promote health.
State discourse
Since economic reform began in 1979, the revival of superstitious practices and beliefs (mixin) seems to be a widespread phenomenon, an unexpected and hard-to-tackle issue for the government unprepared for it after years of socialist education. Quite a few articles in the Chinese press, as well as TV and radio broadcasts, discuss the issue. Recently more than ever, along with the current political campaign against Falun gong, superstition is constantly presented as being opposed to science: official discourse is arguing that the present-day level of Chinese scientific knowledge and achievement could never have been reached without a vigorous fight having been waged against superstition. The aerospace industry and the launching of satellites are often quoted as a model, to prove the high level and competitiveness of Chinese science (CCTV1, July 28, 1999 Kexue yu mixin 'Science and superstitions'). This campaign shows once more the actuality and the permanence of a state discourse focusing on the irrational aspect of superstitions, as opposed to the rationality and efficacy of science. This aspect impedes the development and the modernization of society in the eyes of the government.
Qigong health practices blossomed during the eighties under official institutional care along with Traditional Chinese Medicine, zhongyi. The first official Qigong organizations which date from the fifties were an intrinsic part of Maoist China's health policies, but were closed down during the cultural revolution, after having been classified as superstitious (Despeux 1997: 269-270). Harrassment of Qigong practitioners and a crackdown on their activities are not new as the communist regime has been embarrassed by these polymorphic unclassable groups since the early 1990s, and to come to grips with them adopted an ambiguous strategy, alternately praising and stigmatizing them. But then they were scattered and localized. What is new is the scale of the crackdown, of which the magnitude betrays the extent of worries assailing the government. This last decade, religious practices and beliefs have emerged more obviously and are sometimes openly proclaimed, and if this is not the case, present but hiding behind health practices and beliefs, even in the case of medical Qigong yixue qigong (practiced in the medical institutions although not exclusively) or scientific Qigong kexue qigong (subject of scientific experimentation) (Micollier 1996). The entanglement of health, healing, and religious practices is well documented by health anthropologists, as the cultural construction of health and illness is related to a local world view embedded in religious belief, interacting with an imperialistic modern science in a globalizing world. Qigong appeared as an ideal surrogate to fill up the ideological gap which has been a thorny problem of the last two decades in P.R. Chinese society as religion is still considered to be an 'opium for the people' by officials true to the consensual political line, although a re-evaluation of religion is in process in the field of social sciences. A comparative perspective with the revival of Qigong in Taiwan which is occurring partly under Mainland Chinese influence, justifies the claim that religion is the significant core of Qigong: in Taiwan, where religious practices and belief are not restrained, Qigong practices are either integrated into religious groups (local religious cult communities, sectarian 'New religions' xinxing zongjiao, neo-Buddhist groups) or in civic groups brought together by a quest for self development, for spiritual achievement, or for environmental re-evaluation. This awareness may be interpreted as a response to widespread consumerism in a materialistic-oriented society.
Qigong groups
Qigong groups are known under the following denominations: Qigong pai (schools, factions, a traditional term for martial arts and religious groups), Qigong xiehui (associations), Qigong xuehui (scholarly association, among them yanjiuhui 'research association'), hui (society), minjian xiehui (popular associations). Qigong associations are either official, semi-official/semi-civic, or informal/popular (non-registered). They may be involved in social issues. For instance, groups sharing an ecologically-oriented ideology, express their concern for environmental issues: 'A petition calling for better environmental protection, launched jointly by some Qigong groups from Sichuan and Heilongjiang managed to gather several hundred thousand signatures (Zhongguo huanjing bao 'Chinese Journal of the Environment', Febr. 18, 1995, cited by Vermander 1999: 19).
Qigong groups and social organizations share a number of features such as methods of working and networking, structural ties with the State, registration under umbrella organizations, part of the membership holding official and political functions (PCC members). They are organizing themselves and their relations with the State the same way, and some Qigong groups may be considered social organizations. The diversity of such groups, their activities and ideas appealing to members from all walks of life, contribute towards building up a particular civil society in China, certainly not drawn from the Western approach based on the state-society opposition civil society consisting in organizing an opposition to the State: Chinese sociologists have explicitly highlighted the dualistic 'semi-official-semi-civic' nature of most Chinese civic associations. The emergence of an intermediary level of organization may be explained by pressures emanating from both the state and society (Sun 1994). An unprecedented growth in civic associations both in number and diversity took place in the Era of Reform and has slowed following a nation-wide freeze in 1996. A large number of civic associations are registered as scholarly associations although their activities might have little scholarly content: a possible explanation is that they faced lower bureaucratic hurdles in obtaining official approval (Pei 1998: 313). Boosted by an official promotion during the fifties, Qigong activities were integrated into scientific and medical research institutions. The fact that a number of Qigong groups, at least the most successful of them, have been registered as scholarly associations, is relevant to further analysis. For instance, the Falun gong school was registered under the umbrella of the powerful and structurally closely tied to the State 'China Society for Research on Qigong Science' until Nov. 1996 when it was kicked out of the organization following a ban on Li Hongzhi's publications issued by the Propaganda Bureau of the CCP.
A close analysis of the 1989 pro-democracy students' and workers' movement, and the 1999 Falun gong peaceful demonstrations (claiming official recognition and the lifting of the ban on Li's latest publication), both officially perceived as challenging state authority, have shown that even official or semi-official organizations structurally tied to the government, can escape from state control and enjoy operational and ideological autonomy to such an extent that they can play an independent political role. *
References
- Despeux, C.
Le Qigong, une expression de la modernité chinoise in Gernet J., Kalinowski M. (eds) En suivant la Voie Royale: Mélanges en hommage à L. Vandermeersch
Paris, EFEO, 1997, Etudes thématiques 7: 267-281
- MacInnis, D.E.
Religion in China Today.
Policy and Practice,
New York, Orbis books, 1989
- Micollier, E.
Entre science et religion, tradition
et modernité: le discours pluriel des pratiquants de Qigong, in Benoist, J. (ed.) Soigner au pluriel: Essais sur le pluralisme médical,
Paris, Karthala, 1996, pp 205-223
- Pei, Minxin
Chinese Civic Associations: An empirical analysis' Modern China 24(3): 285-318, 1998
- Sun, Bingyao
Zhongguo shehui tuanti guanmin erchongxing wenti (The issue of the dualism of Chinese civic associations), Chinese Social Science Quarterly,
Febr.: 17-23, 1994
- Vermander, B.
The Law and the Wheel: The sudden emergence of the Falungong: prophets of spiritual civilisation' China Perspectives 24: 14-21, 1999
Dr Evelyne Micollier, ESF / Alliance Fellow stationed at IIAS Amsterdam branch, can be reached at e-mail: micollier@pscw.uva.nl