A Tug-of-War between the Public and the Private in Traditional Korea
Choso(breve)n Korea (1392-1910) was basically a land of 'philosophers'. Kings and literati, who were chiefly fundamentalist Neo-Confucians, tried to steer the kingdom by the principles of Neo-Confucian political philosophy. Among others, the principles of filial piety and loyalty to the king were the most fundamental of the Neo-Confucian political principles. According to the Neo-Confucian rule, filial piety came before fealty when there happened to be a collision between the two.
By KARPCHON KIM
In contrast to this philosophical rule, the logic of political reality continued to exist in the field of politics. None of the political actors who were in charge of the continuity of their kingdom could escape from their political or historical responsibility. This allowed the introduction of some exceptions to the Neo-Confucian political rules, especially to the rule of the priority of filial piety.When we consult An Authentic Record of the Choso(breve)n Dynasty, the tension between the Confucian philosophy and the Choso(breve)n Korean political reality led mainly to three dimensions of collisions: (1) public administration, (2) Confucian system of rites, and (3) historical consciousness. Throughout these conflicts, we can trace a tug-of-war between the public and the private in the political context of Choso(breve)n.
Firstly, let's begin with the dimension of 'public administration'. The collision between the principles of 'people's affairs' and 'state affairs' appeared in the political disputes of the Choso(breve)n political figures for the first time during King Injo's reign (1623-1649). At that time, King Injo and his court tried to reconstruct the kingdom in the aftermath of about seven years of international war (1592-1598) in North East Asia between, on one side, Choso(breve)n and Ming China, and, on the other side, Japan which blitzkrieged Choso(breve)n. Besides that, the king and his men still have to keep an eye on the powerful Japan. What is more, they had to keep the other eye on the strong and rising Jurchen Manchus because of their pro-Ming, anti-Manchu policy.
However, all these projects were almost impossible to realize. Above all, Choso(breve)n's annual crop was not only insufficient for the government's expenses, but even for its population's food supply. The government could barely provide its soldiers with food. This was because nearly a half of cultivated acreage of Choso(breve)n was devastated by the international war, and the other half of the acreage was suffering a series of natural disasters at that time.
As a result, there was a collision between the absolute necessity of collecting tax revenues according to the regulations, i.e. 'state affairs', and the Neo-Confucian imperative of relieving the starving poor people, i.e. 'people's affairs'. The core group of political figures, including the king, was helplessly leaning toward the principle of 'state affairs'. With reference to this, we can find that several officers sent up a critical memorial to the Throne: 'The Royal Court deviated from the right path to calling magistrates to task. It praises the ones who cold-heartedly collect taxes for applying themselves in their duties and criticizes the others who treat the people with attentive consideration for pursuing their reputation or good name. Owing to this, [the Confucian teaching of] one continuum of state affairs and people's affairs are separated into two parts.'
Emergency call
Secondly, let's look into the dimension of 'Confucian system of rites'. On the one hand, Neo-Confucian philosophy emphasized the precedence of filial piety over other values. According to the Neo-Confucian rule, filial piety took priority over fealty when there happened to be a collision between the two.
On the other hand, kings and scholar-bureaucrats of Choso(breve)n governed the kingdom by the principle of filial piety, and not that of fealty. In other words, their supreme principle of politics was 'the government by the principle of filial piety'. The political actors considered the practice of filial piety to be the nursery for all the good behaviour of the people, particularly with respect to loyalty to the king. In consequence, all the leadership, not to mention the king, and the people were supposed to observe the three years' Neo-Confucian system of funeral rites when their parents passed away.
However, the principle had an exception. When there happened to be a national emergency, the king was legally allowed to call the officers out of their observing the rites. The officers, in principle, could resist this 'emergency call' because the Neo-Confucian principle of the priority of filial piety over fealty remained in force out there in the Choso(breve)n Korean life-world. From the beginning of the dynasty and into the seventeenth century, the king very often exercised the right to 'emergency call' to a wide hierarchical range of the civil and military officers. Therefore, there were frequent tensions and disputes over the validity of the 'emergency call' between the bureaucrats as well as the king and his scholar-bureaucrats. For all that, the officers rarely resisted it successfully.
The scholar-bureaucrats' resistance against the king's right to 'emergency call' got stronger around the seventeenth century. In that period, we can find typical cases of successful resistance. It seems to have resulted from the fact that the Neo-Confucianization of Choso(breve)n Korean life-world was complete and the power of the bureaucrats against that of the king got stronger from that time onward. Nevertheless, since then the frequency of the discussions and disputes over the issue of 'emergency call' decreased conspicuously. This seems to be a result of the founding of Ching China recovering the balance of power in the East Asian 'world' system where Choso(breve)n could enjoy relative security of its life-world.
Trunk and wings
Finally, we come to the dimension of 'historical consciousness'. In the Neo-Confucian tradition of Choso(breve)n Korea, Confucian 'Scriptures' or 'Holy Books' took priority over historical books which contained political reality. Hence a large majority of Choso(breve)n political actors emphasized the 'philosophy' and applied 'the way of the Scriptures' to present and urgent political problems only. For instance, they just followed the principle of priority of filial piety over loyalty to the king.
In contrast, a handful of political actors who set importance on political or historical responsibility were willing to try 'the way of expediency' as well as 'the way of the Scriptures' for the continuity of their state. They, as political practitioners, had a preference not only for the principle of fealty, but also for political reality. In particular, a few of them paid attention to the political meaning and value of history itself. The political actors with this kind of opinion can be found sporadically in the second half of the Choso(breve)n Dynasty. One good example is Choi Myo(breve)ng-gil (1586-1647).
Though officially he was sure to be a Neo-Confucian, he had an unusual viewpoint on 'taking history as the trunk and the Scriptures as the wings', contrary to the authentic version of 'taking the Scriptures as the trunk and history as the wings'. He emphasized political responsibility in political actors and in the relevance of their theories. Accordingly, he picked up the viewpoint on 'taking history as the trunk and the Scriptures as the wings'.
As I mentioned above, if there is no public sphere, there is no political life. Political life is accompanied by political responsibility and political obligation, which are particularly important values of modern politics. This makes up the background of the opinions that emphasize fealty, political reality and history.
Nonetheless, the opinions which lay emphasis on filial piety, philosophy or truth, and 'the Scriptures' are also very meaningful. It is because humanism, which casts light on our political life, comes from philosophy, truth, or ethics. This, before everything else, was why a large majority of the Choso(breve)n political figures were strongly attached to their philosophy and ethics.
After all, it was inevitable for the Choso(breve)n political figures to make their discussions and disputes over political issues inconclusive, especially in critical moments, although many of them were individually decisive. Most of all, the political actors who insisted on 'the way of the Scriptures' alone were so 'decisive' that the discussions and disputes very often failed to lead to a 'decision'. This seems to be one of the causes that made Choso(breve)n not only incompetent for solving its political problems but also vulnerable to foreign powers. *
Dr KarpChon Kim is a Visiting Exchange Fellow (Korea Research Foundation) at the IIAS E-mail: kkim@let.leidenuniv.nl