The Korean Model of Coup
Two coups that took place in Korea centuries apart are compared here; 'Injo panjong'of March 13, 1623, and the 'May 16 Military Revolution' in 1961. KarpChon Kim demonstrates that there are three meaningful similarities to be found.
By DR KARPCHON KIM
'Injo panjong' or 'King Injo's Restoring Things to Righteousness', staged on March 13, 1623, during the Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910) was mentioned officially three times by the army officers who had a genuine connection with coup plans in which Park Chung Hee was involved. The first such mention occurred during an abortive coup which took place when President Syngman Rhee was still in office. In this case, the coup plan was code-named 'panjong' from 'Injo panjong' by Colonel Chong Lae-hyok.It was also referred to twice during the 'May 16 Military Revolution' in 1961. Colonel Yu Won-shik had been planning a military coup with Park Chung Hee since the last stage of the Syngman Rhee Government and right after the coup as a member of the Supreme Council's finance and economic committee was responsible for forming a special committee to draw up a five-year plan for economic development. He referred to 'Injo panjong' twice in the presence of Park Chung Hee, and once even said in front of President Yun Po-son: 'We regard this revolution as Injo panjong.'
This teaches us that Korean army officers, who were members of the most modernized organization in South Korea around that time, had a very precise knowledge of at least some parts of the history of their country and also were conscious of it. We can confirm this point by pointing out several similarities between the two coups. Three such similarities are the most meaningful.
First, both King Injo, or as he was then Prince Nungyanggun, and Park Chung Hee assumed the responsibility of coup leader right from the early stage of the conspiracies.
In the neo-Confucian world view of the Chosun Korean political actors, kingship was dependent on the Mandate of Heaven (chonmyong) which was based on the contract between a king or emperor and Heaven. Heaven created the universe and the people and gave Its mandate to a king or emperor on condition that he should protect 'the whole duty of man' (kangsang), 'the discipline of the nation' (kikang), and 'the livelihood of the people' (minsaeng)'. To be more precise, 'kangsang' means the universal moral principles of Confucianism and 'kikang' is a system of legal order governing a society.
If the king failed to comply with the contract, at first Heaven warned him of his mistakes through portents such as lightening, storms, earthquakes, phenomena related to Mars, comets, and the like. And then, if the king persisted in being blind to the error of his ways, Heaven withdrew Its mandate and bestowed it on another person (hyokmyong) in his own family or from another family. The former alternative is 'restoring things to righteousness' (panjong) and the latter is 'change of surname' (yoksong).
Theoretically, a pre-Confucian measure of panjong or 'restoring things to righteousness' is resorted to only by subjects who are widely recognized as authentically moral Confucianists when the ruling king is judged to have lost his Mandate of Heaven. As a rule, in a legitimate panjong the would-be king is not allowed to take part in the coup personally but can only be invited to be the new king by the subjects who have risen against the incumbent king in the direct wake of the successful coup.
The Chosun dynasty witnessed two rounds of panjong, i.e. 'Chungjong panjong' or 'King Chungjong's Restoring Things to Righteousness' in 1506 and the 'Injo panjong'. There is one important difference between the two which should be mentioned. The first was a copy-book case of panjong because the would-be king did not himself participate in the coup as a chief leader, but was only selected as the new king after it had been accomplished.
In contrast to what happened in 'King Chungjong's Restoring Things to Righteousness', Prince Nungyanggun illegitimately played a leading personal role in the coup. He assembled a group of soldiers for the coup by spending his money freely and took command of them on the appointed day. Accordingly, although Prince Nungyanggun was considered by outsiders to have entered upon a somewhat illegitimate kingship, he was still thought to be the largest stockholder in the coup project by the coup officials.
This participation gave him such a strong foundation for royal authority in contrast to King Chungjong in that he could take initiative in all the discussions about political reformation and other critical issues and, in particular, keep a firm grip on his sovereignty even after his surrender to Ching China. But on the other hand, because of the illegitimacy of his participation, he and his court, in turn, could not escape being the object of another attempt at panjong or coup.
Kim Chong-pil, Park Chung Hee's collaborator, once said at a press conference directly after the coup that Park Chung Hee had joined the coup group in March 1961 as if he were the coup's instigator and that Park had been invited to be a leader by him and other officers from the eighth class of the military academy. This version runs contrary to the facts.
Park Chung Hee, like King Injo, was the largest stockholder in the 1961 coup right from its earliest inception. This seems to be one of the reasons why he was never confronted by a competitor who directly challenged him in his inner group before his assassination in 1979. In the coup only Park Chung Hee was responsible for all the units which entered Seoul, because all of their commanders were the colonels from the fifth class. The lieutenant-colonels from the eighth class led by Kim Chong-pil, however, had no real means by which to take over the government.
Second, the two coups have three pillars of justification.
The Confucian cause that was used to justify King Injo's coup was 'restoring things to righteousness' (panjong). This consisted of the three components referred to earlier: (1) restoration of 'the whole duty of man' (kangsang), (2) recovery of 'the discipline of the nation' (kikang), and (3) the stabilization of 'the livelihood of the people' (minsaeng).
These pillars are also to be sought in the causes of the May 16 coup. Among the six clauses of 'the revolutionary pledge', the third pertains directly to the category of kangsang and kikang, and the fourth directly to that of minsaeng. The first and fifth fall indirectly under those of kikang and minsaeng. In the terminology of the coup group's official announcement kikang and minsaeng were among the most frequently mentioned important words.
Later Park Chung Hee summed up the pledge to achieve the two major objectives of the 'May 16 revolution' in terms of kangsang, kikang, and minsaeng: 'building morality and the economy' or 'rebuilding our humanity and industry'.
Third, the coups have the same course of legitimation. Prince Nungyanggun's coup went through two stages of legitimation. At first, it was endorsed internally by the queen of Inmokdaebi and then, externally, by the emperor of Ming China which was then the 'father country' of Chosun Korea in its neo-Confucian world view of 'worship of the powerful' or sadae, as well as being the 'Central Country' of the East Asian 'World' system.
Park Chung Hee's coup passed through two stages of legitimation as well. At first it was virtually endorsed by then President Yun Po-sun when he said 'It's a fait accompli', in Park Chung Hee's presence on May 16. Though he did not recognize the military government until the resignation of Chang Myon's cabinet, he did not agree with the commander of the US armed forces in Korea about the suppression of the revolt either. Next, on May 18 the US, the centre country in the contemporary world system, finally recognized the military government as the situation had turned to Park's advantage.
In conclusion, this comparison pertinently allows us to glance at a Korean way of legitimizing and justifying political power. A coup which is initially carried out and justified by a small group without the prior consent of the super power in the world system, and later formally endorsed by the super power, became the model of the coups in Korea following the model of 'King Chungjong's Restoring Things to Righteousness' in 1506. It repeated itself in the coup of Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo on December 12, 1979. *
Dr KarpChon Kim is a Visiting Exchange Fellow (Korea Research Foundation) at the IIAS. He can be reached at:
E-mail: kkim@let.leidenuniv.nl