Democratization in Asia
The 'People Power Revolution' in the Philippines in 1986 was a landmark event in recent Asian History. Not only did it bring an end to the authoritarian rule of President Ferdinand Marcos and reassert the Philippines' longstanding tradition of democratic government (albeit, as Filipinos often describe it, a system of 'elite democracy'), it provided an inspiration to pro-democracy forces elsewhere in Asia.
By RONALD J. MAY
In Indonesia, opponents of President Soeharto were quick to ask in 1986: if President Marcos can be overthrown, is the ageing Soeharto also vulnerable? In Myanmar, when protesters took to the streets of Rangoon in 1988, images of the Philippines two years earlier were clearly in people's minds. People Power parallels were also drawn, and tendencies to democratization identified, in China, Vietnam, and Cambodia.But change did not come to Indonesia. The Burmese regime, after some hesitation, crushed the incipient uprising and moved increasingly towards repressing the opposition. China's democracy movement was overwhelmed in Tiananmen Square in 1989, and tentative steps towards democratization in Vietnam and Cambodia did not go very far. Meanwhile, in Malaysia and Singapore the trend seemed to be more towards tighter state control rather than towards democratization, and in the neighbouring Pacific, the island states saw their first military coup when in 1987 the Fiji military overthrew an elected government.
In retrospect, the circumstances in the Philippines in 1986 were unusual: despite the authoritarian nature of the Marcos regime, elections had been held, there was an organized political opposition, the media had not been completely gagged, there was a robust civil society, the judiciary had not been completely subjugated to the regime, and the armed forces retained an element of professionalism. These conditions were not replicated in most of Asia, where centralized state control was often supported by reference to 'Asian values' and the need for strong state control to ensure economic growth.
Events in Indonesia in May 1998 revived a discourse on democratization in Asia particularly in relation to Myanmar, where there are obvious parallels in an ageing leadership, a tradition of student protest, and disgruntled minorities on the geographic periphery threatening the unity of the state. It remains to be seen, of course, just how far the events set in train in May 1998 represent a genuine shift towards democracy in Indonesia. The recent tragic events in East Timor emphasize the extent to which an unreformed military still plays a major role in Indonesian politics. But, assuming that Indonesia is undergoing at least some degree of democratization, the question might be asked: was the fall of Soeharto a reflection of a continuing, generalized movement towards democracy in Asia, or was it, like the demise of the Marcos regime in in 1986, a product of the circumstances in a particular country at a particular point of time?
For some years, explanations of Soeharto's ability to remain in control in Indonesia pointed to Indonesia's economic performance: a steady improvement in average income levels gave the Soeharto regime a good measure of 'performance legitimacy', while significant elements of a growing middle class saw their interests inextricably linked to those of the regime. Yet, when the 'Asian crisis' of 1997-98 hit Indonesia, this counted for little: the populace was quick to support pro-democracy activists, and links to the regime offered poor protection to wealthy businessfolk, especially among the ethnic Chinese.
Secondly, although the transition from Soeharto might have been a much more troubled one than it has been so far, the unfolding of events in Indonesia provides a clear example of the political instability which can ensue when a highly politicized, ageing regime makes no clear provision for succession. As happened in the case of the Marcos regime, signs of Soeharto's physical weakening prompted manoeuvring among people who sought to secure their place in a successor regime, suggesting some weakening of the regime itself.
Thirdly, once popular forces begin to challenge a centralized state in a culturally plural society like that of Indonesia, the assertion of regional and ethnic separatism is encouraged. Regional movements, effectively suppressed while the state and its coercive apparatus is strong, emerge to reassert their claims for autonomy or independence, and threaten the integrity of the nation-state (as we now see in East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya).
In the case of Myanmar, the first of these considerations seems only marginally relevant. The (formal) economy has been depressed for some time (though the narcotics-based black economy appears to be booming); while economic factors almost certainly did play a part in triggering off the unsuccessful uprising of 1988, they seem unlikely to do so again in the foreseeable future. Moreover, as a member of ASEAN, Myanmar expects to see a substantial inflow of foreign investment as the Asian economies revive. Turning to the second, notwithstanding recurring rumours of prospective splits within the military establishment, the State Peace and Development Council appears to have strengthened its control over the political apparatus, while the opposition appears to have become progressively weaker in the face of government repression and cease-fire agreements with the ethnic insurgents. These cease-fire agreements which have given former insurgent groups in the border areas a fair degree of local autonomy have also reduced the immediate threat to the state of ethnic separatism. It is possible that, through its membership of ASEAN and as a result of wider international action, Myanmar will come under pressure to democratize, but to date ASEAN has shown little collective will to push democratization and Myanmar has indicated no propensity to bow to international demands, even on issues of human rights. If Myanmar is the next prospective domino to fall to democracy, its fall does not appear to be imminent.
The sudden fall of Soeharto in May 1998 demonstrates that political change can sometimes occur with unexpected rapidity. But those who predict a steady and ineluctable progress towards democratization in Asia would seem to be informed more by wishful thinking than by a close reading of even recent history. *
Ronald J. May is senior fellow in the Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University, and co-ordinator of the Regime Change and Regime Maintenance in Asia and the Pacific Project.
E-mail: ron.may@anu.edu.au