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Tibet in the West & the West in Tibet Letters to the Editor 1 It was gratifying to find several informative articles on Tibetan affairs in IIAS Newsletter #16. However, the article 'Tibet in the West and the West in Tibet' by Dr Amalendu Misra seems to get only one thing right, namely that Tibet is an endangered species. By the end of column two the name Melvyn Goldstein came irresistibly to my mind. I looked for references to the article and there he was, as the author's main informant. The article as a whole appears to assume that 'the West' is some homogeneous body that has a mandate to oversee what needs to be done to stabilize relationships between large countries and their minority peoples in revolt. Its tone is colonial in its treatment of a small nation with a distinct language, culture, and religion like Tibet: 'to make the Tibetans understand' etc. The Tibetans are quite capable of maintaining their culture in exile until the year of four dots, if they decide to do so. The author leans predominantly on one book for his references, written by an academic who in turn is extremely selective in choosing his informants. Dr Misra's article seems to assume that the exoticism of Tibet is the main casualty of the Chinese take-over and that most academics and/or Westerners know little else but the exotic features of old Tibet. I wish to examine some of Dr Misra's specific claims and factually untrue statements in detail. The 'monochromatic image of Tibet' has been Dr Misra's preoccupation, not that of 'the West', because the West is not a unified body or voice. In the world of Tibetology there are many voices, as there are in the world of Tibet independence supporters and Tibet watchers. Amongst these Melvyn Goldstein stands apart as a scholar who does not appear to have his long-term research projects in Tibet frustrated by Chinese authorities, who advocates that Tibet is part of China, and overlooks why virtually no refugees dare return to Tibet and 5000 come south over the Himalayas in the dead of winter every year. His concern for Tibet's culture appears to cover only the purely material, that is, culture not associated with the Buddhist religion Tibet has espoused for 1300 years. Yet Tibet identity and Buddhism are almost synonymous, cutting across class, city-rural and central-east or west divisions. The author states that 'the West' should make crucial enquiries about a) the political situation in Tibet outside Lhasa pre-1950, b) whether Tibetans inside and outside Tibet distrust modernization, and c) whether there is consensus among Tibetans about returning to a feudal theocratic order. The author may be relieved to hear that all these enquiries have been made long ago, not necessarily by Western academics or power-brokers, but by Tibetans themselves. Even informed Western tourists have often read beyond Lhasa politics, as far as Kham, Chang Tang, and Tashilhunpo's long-standing contact with southern border regimes. Tibetans have on the whole taken to modernization with great fascination, certainly from the time of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama on, though they choose what they find useful and retain their own where they see fit. What they object to is the price exacted by China in return for communist modernization: their independence, one million dead, exile, cultural and environmental destruction. If ever there was a country about which we should ask 'What price progress?' it certainly is Tibet, if not China proper itself. There is no recorded consensus amongst Tibetans inside and outside Tibet about returning to a 'feudal theocratic order', because 1) The Chinese ignored a proposal by the Dalai Lama to hold a referendum on Tibet's future status among all Tibetans, 2) the Tibetan government-in-exile and the Dalai Lama turned their backs on the feudal system years ago and installed democratic elections with regional representatives and political parties in exile with a view to importing that system into Tibet, and 3) the Dalai Lama has widespread support from exiled Tibetans about his role, which is not feudal but something peculiarly Tibetan that few other nations possess. Therefore Western labels ill fit him. The 'one good thing about Chinese intervention was the dispensing of social justice' says the author. But it came at the previously mentioned high price paid by Tibetans and didn't turn out to be justice at all. Schools only taught in Tibetan for a short while and are back to a Chinese curriculum for language and Tibetan history. Hospitals are avoided especially by Tibetan women, because of so many having been sterilized without their knowledge or permission, while undergoing other treatment or after giving birth. Chinese attempts at land redistribution has benefited more than six million landless Chinese immigrants, the Tibetans being transferred or disowned if it suits Chinese reform plans. Beijing's 'rapid economic development strategy' in Tibet has caused immense damage in a fragile environment. Mainly it is concerned with extracting Tibet's natural resources for a ravenous Chinese economy. Hydro-electric schemes installed for industrial purposes have been disasters of bad workmanship, like at Yamdrok Tso. The plan to build 20 dams in Kham rivers to support a steel industry will, if it goes ahead, turn one of the world richest biodiverse environments into a polluted cesspool that will poison half of China via its rivers. Already gold and mineral digging is destroying Kham's riverbanks, while its forests were disappearing at the rate of 465 logging trucks per day in the summer I was there. Rapid, yes. But an economic strategy? Vandalism backed by the military is closer to the reality. And the profits are not meant to stay in Tibet. Tibet's independence was not short-lived. In recent centuries Tibet was independent whenever the Chinese needed their armies at home. Even when infiltrated, Tibetans ruled Tibet. Invading neighbouring countries was the Han pastime whenever they could afford it. The neighbours weren't much different and China was invaded and ruled at times, wholly or in part by Manchus, Mongols, Tartars, and Tibetans. Does that give these peoples an ancient claim on China proper, that China that contains evidence of Chinese culture and civilization, though the Han were once a conquered people? Does the world community mean to enter the twenty-first century clinging to barbarian rules of conquest? Conquest confers rights no longer. Only a weak UN and expediently greedy governments keep protecting the spoils of big nations like China, in case they can profit too. Colonialism is alive and flourishing. 'The West's involvement in this [deadlock over Tibet's status] is absolutely essential,' claims the author. 'First, it has to make the Tibetans understand the futility of their demands for complete independence,' he writes. Who is this 'West' and which Tibetans are to be so addressed: exiles, Tibetan Youth Congress, the Khambas, Tibetans in Tibet, or the Dalai Lama who has been telling Beijing for years that he wishes to negotiate about 'genuine autonomy', with China looking after foreign affairs and defence. That message has been taken to Beijing ad nauseam and not even an acknowledgement has been forthcoming. 'Beijing treats Tibet as an autonomous region,' the author claims. Not so, as anyone who has travelled there acknowledges, except Professor Goldstein. What protection Chinese authorities have lately given to Tibet's cultural-religious heritage has been for reasons of impressing tourists whose dollars are needed, and has not been extended to the Tibetan people themselves, who now observe so many aspects of their religion at the risk of losing their limited liberty or their lives, that thousands prefer to flee the country at the risk of death by frostbite. Many have nothing to lose anyway but their lives, and liberty to gain. A bibliography of books Dr Misra could profitably read before next publishing on Tibetan affairs would be many pages long. For he is right when observing that many works are being published in the face of Tibet's possible extinction. Time is running out for Tibet. Lolo J. G. Houbein Strathalbyn, Australia 2 Line two of the second paragraph of 'Tibet in the West and the West in Tibet' in IIAS Newsletter 16 should read: 'Though ruled by the Dalai Lamas from the seventeenth (not seventh) century onwards . . .' Line 13 of the same paragraph should read: 'paying tribute to the Manchu (not Ming) emperor of China'. The author regrets the mistakes. Amalendu Misra 3 I was glad to find some articles about Tibet in Newsletter #16. Being both a Tibetologist and Mongolist, I expected them to be of a certain standard and was shocked when I read the article 'Tibet in the West and the West in Tibet' by Amalendu Misra. I do not expect to read in the IIAS Newsletter that Tibet was 'ruled by Dalai Lamas from the seventh century onwards', or 'The political history of modern Tibet starts from eighteenth century when it was taken under control by the Mongol, Lohabsang Khan, while paying tribute to the Ming emperors of China.' These are only two examples of the grave errors committed by the author of this article. Even in popular magazines I did not find such ridiculously wrong statements about Tibetan political history. Karenina Kollmar-Paulenz Königswinter, Germany 4 I am distressed to note that Amalendu Misra, the author of the review article 'Tibet in the West and the West in Tibet', should demonstrate such surprising ignorance of the history and culture of Tibet as to write: 'Though ruled by Dalai Lamas from the seventh century onwards, the actual political status of Tibet has always been subject to the political process beyond its frontiers.' From the seventh to the mid-ninth century Tibet was subject to a line of rulers generally known as the Yarlung Kings from their main basis in the Yarlung Valley. The independence of Tibet in that early period was unquestioned and these kings were frequently at war with China. As for the 'Dalai Lama', this title was bestowed upon the third Grand Lama of the dGe-lugs-pa (Yellow Hat) Order by the Mongol chieften Altan Khan about the year 1578. The dGe-lugs-pa Order was founded by the great reorganizer of religious life in Tibet, Tsong-kapa (1357-1419). It was established as the ruling religious authority in Tibet by the arms of another Mongol chieftain, Gushri Khan, resulting in the final defeat of the King of Tsang in 1640. The first 'Dalai Lama' to exercise power in the Tibet was the famous fifth, and thus it can be fairly said that the Dalai Lamas have ruled Tibet from the mid-seventeenth century onwards, first under nominal Mongol suzerainty and subsequently under nominal Chinese suzerainty from 1721 onwards, when the Manchu Emperor K'ang Hsi drove Dzungar Mongol forces from Tibet. Chinese claims to suzerainty over Tibet thus date from the early eighteenth century onwards. David Snellgrove Torre Pellice, Italy

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