Bhutan: A New Threat to Shangri-La Security
The Bhutanese peaceful Shangri-la dragon kingdom was conveniently left to itself by the world, even by its immediate neighbours, till the 1980s. By 1990, events began to happen which disturbed the Bhutanese idyll: ethnic demands, arrests, demonstrations, trials, convictions, police excesses, assaults, arson, looting, all eventually developing into a full-blown ethnic conflict.By A.C. Sinha
The Drukpa theocracy which was replaced by Wangchuk dynastic rule ninety years ago continues to provide the ethos, identity, and rationale behind the existence of Bhutan as a distant Lamaist polity. Since it was deposed, four rulers have each tried to introduce some elements of secular dimension into the body politic with a view to bringing it into line with other political systems. For example, the medieval monastic authority was replaced by a feudal system, enthusiastically supported by the British colonial rulers. With a view to generating the required economic surplus for the 'State', a number of steps were undertaken in consultation with the British. One such step was to encourage ethnic Nepalese to clear the unhealthy Duar (Southern Mountain Passes) forests and plant cereals and cash crops on the the land this gained. These hundred-year old Nepalese settlements on the southern frontiers (Lhatsharnpas) developed into an organized, compact agrarian system on the model of the Hindu kingdom of Nepal. Once the Wangchuk principality decided to transform itself into a nation state, it found itself confronted by the problem of ethnic identity posed by the Nepalese settlers.To be fair to the Bhutanese rulers, they have never been in doubt about their national character and ethnic identity. The Drukpa theocracy, the Buddhist world view, and Bhutanese traditions and history have always provided the sheet anchor of their political culture. It is a Buddhist country, ruled by a Wangchuk king, who is advised by a quasi-elected assembly, not necessarily based on the principles of democratic participation. Furthermore, all the gazetted bureaucrats are nominated members of the policy-framing national assembly. It is a protocol -- prone, feudal structure in which royalty effortlessly integrates itself with commoners. Whenever the ruling elite needs to introduce a new institution for the state structure, they look back to their past and then identify, discover, interpret and adapt what is suitable from their theocratic fold. Needless to say, the contribution of the Lhotshampas to the legitimate ordering of the Bhutanese polity is virtually nothing.
By its own definition Bhutan is not a plural society, not a democracy, and not even a constitutional monarchy. To look for plurality, democracy and a written constitution in Bhutan passes the comprehension of the ordinary Bhutanese.
It may not be correct to claim that only after the 1949 Indo-Bhutanese treaty did Bhutan achieve an international persona. The moment it tried to have the world take note that there was a Buddhist Kingdom in the Himalayas, it faced its first ethnic conflict. The Bhutan State Congress, a forum of the Lhatshampas, started a movement in 1953 for the establishment of a popular government, the abolition of feudal privileges, and the merger of Bhutan with India. Because of the limited support base in Bhutan, and even more because of the non-existence of a democratic political culture, this movement for a Nepalese share in the body politic of Bhutan failed utterly. The third Bhutan King, who is rightly credited with providing the structural foundation for the emergent Bhutanese state, evolved a policy of integrating the ethnic Nepalese into the polity. Accordingly, the teaching of Nepali and Sanskrit was introduced. Nepalese students were sent abroad for higher education. A cash reward was granted for inter-ethnic marriages between Drukpa and Lhotshampa, and the Nepalese were given representation at the rate of 14 per cent in the state structure ranging from the village to the Royal Advisory Council.
All these steps elicited a happy response from the Nepalese in Bhutan. They took advantage of the provisions and many of them rose high in the state structure. The best trial of the ethnic integration in Bhutan was the detached response of the Nepalese during 1964 - 1974, when two serious efforts were made to oppose the continuation of the monarchy itself. They first occurred when Jigmie Dorji, the prime minister of the country and the royal consort's brother, was shot dead in 1964 at Phunsoling in southern Bhutan and the country was plunged into an internal conflict. The second, when the present king was to be crowned, a mistress of the third king and her associates tried to up-stage the succession in 1974 and supported an alleged illegitimate son of the former king to be crowned as the king. Similarly, occasional searches to find and consecrate an incarnation of the Dharmaraja by a section of the Drukpas did not find favour with the ethnic Nepalese in Bhutan. The 1970s was a period of smooth transition in Bhutan in more than one sense. Bhutan became a member of the UNO; the third king passed away; the present king took over the reins of the administration and Bhutan began to diversify its economy and reluctantly play her role in the community of nations. The ethnic Nepalese (Lhotshampas) joined their Drukpa brethren in such endeavours and in the process enriched themselves. Many of them began to feel confident enough to take up any role and eschewed the insecurity complex of an ethnic minority.
It is a profitable exercise to see the presence of ethnic Nepalese in Bhutan in the context of the Nepalese settlement in the Himalayan foothills since 1816, from the Sutlej River in Himachal Pradesh in the west to the Arakan hills in Myanmar in the east, as a British defence strategy. Needless to add that the nerve centre of such an extensive ethnic presence lay primarily in the Kathmandu valley. Outside Nepal itself, Dehradun, Varanasi and Darjeeling emerged in course of time as significant supplementary Nepalese centres in course of time. The last quarter of the 20th century has seen the Brahmaputra catchment areas (or the eastern Himalayan foothills) embroiled in all types of turmoil. The Nepalese of the region could not remain aloof from such agitation. As a precaution to protect their country from any spill-over effects of the ethnic agitation afflicating India, the Bhutanese took some legal and administrative steps to screen the Lhotshampas in the late 1980s. The enlightened, educated, and ambitious Lhotshampa were shocked and reacted fast in an unplanned reflex. What resulted in was an ethnic panic and socio-economic turmoil leading to a Nepalese exodus to refugee camps in Nepal. While the Lhotshampa leaders began using democratic and revolutionary idioms in their statements, the Bhutanese felt for a while that they had solved their ethnic problems by evicting the trouble-shooters. It was not to be. Nepal took up the cause of their ethnic cousins in the camps. Since then there have been seven rounds of talks between Nepal and Bhutan without any settlement being reached. Under these circumstances, this most peaceful and open border between India and Bhutan has now turned into a zone of ethnic strife.
The southeastern area of Bhutan bordering on the sea -- growing Bodo tribal districts of Assam of India -- was once remote from the hub of the Bhutanese cultural and political life. The region is known for its precious forest products, agrarian cash crops and amicable ethnic relations (known as the Kurma system). All these have been shattered, firstly because of the Lhotshampas desertions and secondly by the presence of the Bodo (Bodo Security Force/ Bodo Liberation Tiger Force) and Assamese (United Liberation Force of Assam, ULFA) insurgents since 1993. The insurgents have no respect for the traditional relations and tranquility and they are armed with the latest sophisticated weapons. It is not clear how far the Lhotshampa dissenters and the India insurgents are in league with each other, but one thing is clear, there is no longer an effective Bhutanese administration in the region. Of late, the insurgents have attacked Bhutanese installations and officials. They have been able to establish a local support system by offering financial inducements and inflated prices for the goods and services provided to them. And right on the insurgents' heels, the Indian armed forces have moved in the Bhutan hills to flush them out as part of their counter-insurgency drive.
Foreign policy
Whether Bhutan likes to it or not its ethnic conflict has become an international issue. Nepal is an active adversary of Bhutan, taking the part of the dissenters. International forums for refugee rehabilitation and human rights groups as well as investigative journalists appear supportive of the refugees. The Bhutanese establishment has mounted an effective and aggressive diplomatic move all over the world to project their point of view successfully and counteract the claims made on behalf of the refugees. These moves and counter-moves have generated an interest in the affairs of Bhutan. Therefore over the last couple of years concerned scholars have met in London, Berkeley, Delhi, Jaipur and elsewhere to debate on the affairs of Bhutan.
Undeniably the touchstone of the Bhutanese foreign policy is its friendship with India. The Bhutanese of all persuasions make it a point that their friendship with India has stood the test of time and it has worked in their favour admirably well. Furthermore, the limited diplomatic exposure the Bhutanese have had at multi-lateral and regional levels, has been skillfully utilized to project its avowed objective of presenting a Shangri-la image of an endangered existence. Undeniably, Bhutan has been able to win ample sympathy for its cause; but there are problems as well. For example, the Indian friendship may appear a solid edifice at the top, but the basic reality at micro-level may be at variance with the national leadership. Aware of their being a land-locked nation, the Bhutanese have cultivated West Bengal and Assamese provincial authorities in the interest of fostering a cordial neighbourly relationship. However of late a serious problem in the form of rebel hide-outs on the tri-junction of West Bengal, Assam, and Bhutan has emerged in the Indian province of Assam. The Bodo and ULFA rebels have not only disturbed the local ethnic and socio-economic equations, they have posed a serious administrative challenge to the small, ill-equipped Bhutanese security forces. To exacerbate the situation, the Indian armed forces have started pressing the rebels in the Bhutan hills as a part of there counter-insurgency move adding to the dimensions of the ethnic conflict. Bhutan has had no experience in handling this unprecedented development in armed insurgency. All in all, these are ominous symptoms for Bhutan at its juncture.
As a part of her regional aspirations, Bhutan tried to open a trade corridor with Bangladesh across Indian province of West Bengal. Fruit, timber, stonechips, leather etc. were identified as the Bhutanese export to and consumer goods as the imports from Bangladesh. Because of the limited consumer market in Bhutan the trade between the two countries was in favour of Bhutan. The Bhutanese tried to buy jutebags at an affordable price from Bangladesh to off-set trade imbalance, but this did not work to the satisfaction of either party. Bhutan has practically no trade with Nepal. Similarly, it has no trade relations with her northern neighbour, Tibet (China). Bhutan's major trading partner has been India.
The SAARC summit at Male (Maldives) on 14 May 1997, decided to transform the region into a South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) by 2001. The summit also endorsed the proposal of 'the growth quadrangle' formed by India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal in specific projects such as energy and water resources. These potentialities are yet to be tapped. It seems promising but regional co-operation in harnessing energy and water resources is not easily achieved because of the political distrust among the strategic elite of the SAARC countries. And there lies the positive role of the diplomacy.
To sum up, Bhutanese foreign policy is addressed to safeguarding Bhutanese national interests. Any attack, dilution, or efforts to undermine Drukpa political culture is seen as a threat to the very system of Bhutan. Inevitably the Bhutanese Shangri-la image of an endangered existence revolves around this. The strategic elite of Bhutan are determined to preserve it at all costs. The ongoing ethnic conflict should be seen in this context. The issues of a constitutional monarchy, a written constitution, responsible government, democratic decentralization, etc. fall outside the scope of their traditional political culture. The choice of introducing certain alien institutions in the body politic of Bhutan should be seen as part of an intricate balance between traditionalism and modernizing forces. The foreign policy of Bhutan has a limited role in this context. In fact, it is used more and more in the context of international trade and human resource diplomacy. One must admire Bhutanese achievements in these chosen endeavours and they have been able to canvass sufficient support in favour of their Shangri-la. But it looks as though this euphoria will be short-lived. The uninvited armed insurgents from India have posed a new challenge to the Bhutanese establishment. The way they negotiate this new challenge will determine the survival of Drukpa destiny in the days to come.
:Prof. A.C. Sinha is a Visiting Professor at the TALEEM Research Foundation, City Plaza, Bopal, Ahmedabad 380058 India.